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Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal
Remedies to Achieve Managed Care Accountability
Leatrice Berman-Sandler *
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran
placed the state-based statutory remedy of independent medical review
("IMR") on stronger legal footing.1 IMR is increasingly being used to settle
disputes between patients and their health insurers over what is medically
necessary or experimental or investigational care ("ElI").2  Services
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Department of Preventive Medicine, Northwestern University Medical School; Immediate
Past-Chair, Medical Care Section, American Public Health Association. Thanks to John
Blum, Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law for intellectual support and
guidance; Mark Rust, Attorney, for his insights on ERISA; Elissa Koch, for her skillful
editing and support; Jennifer Roach, for her assistance in manuscript preparation, and my
family for their support and patience.
1. See generally Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002) (holding
that an Illinois statutory provision applicable to HMOs, mandating independent external
review of medical necessity disputes, was not preempted by ERISA).
2. Health plans contract with individuals to provide medically necessary services as
determined by medical standards and clinical protocols that the plans adopt. See Sara
Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Medical Care is Medically Necessary, 340
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 229, 229-30 (1999) (discussing the legal underpinnings of the term
"medical necessity" and the nature of disputes over what is medically necessary). Simply
stated, medical necessity disputes occur between health plans and patients, or health plans
and treating physicians on behalf of their patients, because the patient disagrees with the
doctor or the health plan about the appropriate standard of care or course of treatment for a
specific condition. See Sara Rosenbaum, Managed Care and Patients' Rights, 289 JAMA
906, 906 (2003). Medically necessary services presuppose a set of professional standards
that guide physicians' and other providers' treatment of patient problems and medical
conditions. See infra Part III.C.5; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2, at 229-30. Disputes can
be over any procedure, drug, supply, device, or diagnostic plan that a treating physician
might intend for a patient. FRED LEMIRE & JOHN HESS, UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL CONSORTIUM
GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN MANAGED CARE CONTRACTING (1995). As part of managed care,
services rendered by a health care provider are reviewed to determine whether the services
are medically necessary, a process referred to as utilization review ("UR"). Some services
require pre-authorization; others are concurrently or retrospectively reviewed by UR staff.
Id. The UR staff make initial determinations as to whether a service should be authorized as
medically necessary, or whether the patient should be reimbursed after the service has been
1
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deemed medically necessary are generally covered by insurance; care
deemed E/I is typically not covered.3 The Court in Moran held that by
mandating IMR in Illinois, the state created an obligation equivalent to
adding a mandated insurance benefit or extra-contractual term to a health
policy governing the relationship between the insurer and the insured.4
Such legislative conduct was found to be well within the traditional
authority of the state as insurance regulator, and was thus not preempted by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").5 In
addition, the Court noted the remedies advanced by the IMR process-to
receive the services to which one is entitled or to receive reimbursement for
the services-are consistent with the structure and scope of ERISA
remedies and are not in conflict with its enforcement scheme.6
IMR, also referred to as external appeal or external review, has become
an important feature of managed care and insurance reform legislation,7 but
provided. Thereafter, the plan's Medical Director reviews UR denials and issues a formal
determination of approval or denial for care. UR is a core component of managed health
care because it is critical to the oversight mechanism and key to controlling cost and
ensuring that only necessary care is provided.
3. Some procedures or treatment protocols are deemed experimental or investigational
("E/I") because they are not considered routine medical care or are not scientifically proven
to treat or cure the specific condition, illness, or diagnosis for which their use is proposed.
LEMIRE & HESS, supra note 2. Often, E/I includes promising treatments that have not been
fully tested in clinical research trials. E/I can encompass medical, surgical, psychiatric,
substance abuse, or other health care services and supplies, treatments, procedures, drug
therapies, or devices disallowed by the health plan. Id. In addition, many E/I denials
involve "off-label" drug use, i.e., using FDA-approved pharmaceuticals for a purpose other
than that for which the drug was approved.
4. The Illinois Statute states that each HMO shall provide a mechanism for timely
review by an unaffiliated physician holding the same class of license as the primary care
physician and who will be jointly selected by patient or his legal representative, the primary
care physician, and the HMO in the event that the physician and the HMO disagree on the
medical necessity of the physician's proposed treatment. If the reviewing physician
determines that the treatment is medically necessary, the HMO shall authorize the treatment.
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-10 (2002). Throughout the Moran opinion, the Court discussed
the Illinois law as adding "an extra layer of review" as an additional contract term, which the
reviewer interprets as determining the HMO's obligation or freedom from duty to provide
care. Moran, 536 U.S. at 373, 384, 386.
5. Moran, 536 U.S. at 386.
6. ld. at 385.
7. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ASSESSING STATE
EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS AND THE EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS
LEGISLATION 29 (May 2002) [hereinafter "KAISER ASSESSMENT"]; PATRICIA BUTLER, HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION
LIABILITY LAWS: CURRENT STATUS AND EXPERIENCE (July 2001); GERALDINE DALLEK &
KAREN POLLITZ, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HEALTH PLAN
DECISIONS: AN UPDATE 1 (May 2000); TRUDY LIEBERMAN ET AL., CONSUMER UNION &
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A CONSUMER GUIDE To HANDLING DISPUTE WITH YOUR
EMPLOYER OR PRIVATE HEALTH PLAN, 2003 UPDATE 1-2 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter
[Vol. 13
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it is not new. Michigan began to use external appeals for commercially
insured populations as early as 1978.8 Moreover, at the federal level,
Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Health (Tristar), and Federal Employees
Health Plan programs have had versions of external appeals for many
years. 9 Still, as the health care system has shifted from a fee-for-service
model to a managed care model, IMR has been featured as a critical
response to patient concerns over the increased number of insurance
coverage denials.
Although a detailed analysis of managed care is beyond the scope of this
paper, at its core, the financial structure in managed care can promote
incentives that run counter to the needs of individual patients.' 0 Managed
care contracting between purchasers, such as employers, pension and
welfare funds, and governments and insurers, as well as between insurance
plans and providers and patients, is predicated on setting budgets and
establishing financial incentives to curtail unnecessary utilization." To
achieve this, managed care attempts to restrict choice of providers and self-
referral, which curbs the freedom of consumers to travel through the
medical care system at will to seek the care and the practitioners they
want.12  Utilization curbs are also achieved by proactively employing
review mechanisms and financial incentives, where the latter is tied to the
amount a patient will pay directly out-of-pocket and the amount a provider
will be reimbursed. 13 All of this flows from the logic of managed care to
effectuate lower costs.
After exposure to managed care restrictions constraining patient choice,
coupled with several cases finding health plans liable for prohibiting or
delaying experimental treatment, the American public began to distrust the
process of managed care and question the integrity of care denials.14 As a
"CONSUMER UNION GUIDE"]. All sources are available at www.kff.org.
8. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at vi, Ex. A.
9. Hon. Mary C. Morgan (Retired), Independent Review of Managed Care Decisions,
CAL. HEALTH L. NEWS, Winter/Spring 2000, at 9-10, available at http://csha.calhealth.org/
members/news/vol%20xix/article 1 .htm.
10. See Rosenbaum, supra note 2, at 906.
11. See generally Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Reimbursing Physicians
and Hospitals, 272 JAMA 971 (1994) (describing the general scheme by which health
insurance under managed care structures medical care payment and incentives for providers).
12. See R. Adams Dudley & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care in Transition, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1089 (2001).
13. Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Capitation or Decapitation, 276 JAMA
1025, 1026 (1996) (demonstrating the ways that physicians and hospitals get paid under
capitation arrangements and the structure of risk pools and bonus systems that are key to
implementing provider financial incentives under managed care).
14. Fox v. Healthnet, No. 219692, 1993 WL 794305, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23,
1993).
2004] 235
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result, advocates and reformers in the 1980s and early 1990s sought
legislation to correct a variety of problems with managed care and
advocated for unbiased internal grievance and appeal procedures using
neutral third parties. 15 A later wave of legislation followed in the mid-to-
late 1990s, which strengthened and added new mechanisms of external
appeal. 16
Given the interest in IMR systems by state governments, and the
existence of recent Supreme Court decisions, this paper will report the
findings of a qualitative survey of several states in an effort to expand what
is known about IMR. The central question is whether IMR is a viable legal
remedy and a productive way to exact accountability from the health
insurance and managed care industry. A second and related inquiry
concerns the relationship between IMR and ERISA and whether IMR
procedures could be expanded and strengthened to cover more health plan
participants. Because managed care accountability is evolving dynamically
in both the legislature and the courtroom, the availability of state-based
statutory remedies is of great interest.17 This paper, therefore, will report on
the role of IMR and its future.
Part II will identify the attributes of IMR by briefly reviewing key
findings from national studies that have described the external appeal
process. 18 Part III will describe results of a four-state survey of New York,
California, Pennsylvania and Michigan. The survey gathered information
about the IMR process, key implementation issues, and IMR's impact on
beneficiaries and entities that participate in IMR. 9 Part IV will discuss the
continuing way in which ERISA preemption challenges states' abilities to
15. David M. Studdert & Carole Roan Gresenz, Enrollee Appeals of Preservice
Coverage Denials at 2 Health Maintenance Organizations, 289 JAMA 864, 868-69 (2003);
Tracy Miller, Center Stage on the Patient Protection Agenda: Grievance and Appeal Rights,
26 J. L. MED. ETHICS 89, 90 (1998); John K. Iglehart, The Struggle over Public Opinion,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 7-8 (providing an overview of the reverberations of
providers and the public with respect to the evolution of managed care).
16. Telephone interviews with state directors or legal counsels to IMR systems in four
states: Stacy Mitchell, Dir. of Bureau of Managed Care, Pa. Dep't of Health (Apr. 14, 2003);
Paul Duguay, Attorney, Manager of App. Div., Office of Fin. & Ins. Serv. (OFIS), Mich.
Dep't of Ins. (Apr. 17, 2003); Tom Gilevich, Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Managed Health Care
(DMHC) (Apr. 18, 2003); Judy Doyle, Assoc. Exam'r, Consumer Serv., and Kristin O'Neill,
Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. Dep't of Ins. (Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
"Interviews," collectively and "Interview with" individually].
17. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Establishing New Legal Doctrine in
Managed Care: A Model of Judicial Response to Industrial Change, 32 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 813, 814-16 (1999).
18. See generally KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7 (assessing the status of external
review programs acrosss the country).
19. Interviews, supra, note 16.
[Vol. 13
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make IMR available to wider populations receiving care from employer
self-funded plans in light of the Moran and Kentucky Association of Health
Plans v. Miller2° Supreme Court decisions. Part V will review current ideas
for changing the statutory framework and the adjudicatory process to
effectuate greater impact for patients yet will implicate the challenge
created by ERISA's civil enforcement scheme for implementing changes in
the current IMR process. 21  Although Moran stabilized IMR, it also
demonstrated that ERISA's civil enforcement scheme will continue to
constrain the future development of state-based dispute resolution
mechanisms and remedies.22 Finally, Part VI will address whether federal
and state law can be harmonized given the overriding public equities at
stake.
II. THE NATURE OF IMR AND EXTERNAL APPEAL
External appeals-formal dispute resolution processes between patients
and their health insurers-are now available in forty-two jurisdictions,
including the District of Columbia. 23 Through this process, patients access
external reviews of care denials after exhausting at least one level of a
health plan's internal appeals process and receiving an adverse
determination.24 Although there are a variety of complaint and grievance
mechanisms in place at health plan and state government levels in response
to the consumer movement, external appeal or independent medical review,
is available for disputes specifically focused on the medical necessity of a
medical treatment or service.25 While a greater number of grievances and
consumer complaints are received by states on matters of benefits coverage,
quality of care, or claims payment,26 the most serious area for patient
protection has been in the realm of denying medically necessary care or life
sustaining E/I care.27
20. See generally Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) provides a private right of action to receive or recover benefits
or clarify future benefits due under the terms of an ERISA-sponsored health plan; primarily,
this entitles the beneficiary to equitable relief, contractual damages for benefits owed (for
which the beneficiary has already paid), and, at the discretion of the court, attorney's fees.
Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and
Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 29,
39 (1999).
22. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 376-80 (2002).
23. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 1.
24. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
25. See supra note 2 for discussion of the framework in managed care that has led to
medical necessity disputes.
26. Studdert & Gresenz, supra note 15, at 869. See generally Reports, infra note 105.
27. See generally Fox v. Healthnet, No. 219692, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
20041
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Important differences in IMR across the states reflect variations in the
degree to which legislative provisions provide consumer protection. These
differences can be significant and must be mastered by consumers if they
want to successfully mount appeals.28 Yet, at the same time, a prototype is
emerging that acts as a guidepost for the refinement of these systems across
the country. The attributes of this model are as follows:
* Most states have set up mechanisms directly managed by an
independent state agency, such as Departments of Insurance
(DOI), Managed Health Care, Health Services or Public Health.
Several states, however, still allow health plans to administer the
external review process directly, and eight states have health
plans decide if a dispute is eligible for external review.29
* Although states differ on when a patient can exit a health plan's
internal process, all states require a denial from an internal
appeal process prior to allowing a patient to enter the IMR
system. 30
* Most states target all health plans, including HMOs. Yet,
thirteen jurisdictions only target licensed HMOs, and one state
only targets HMO group plans.3 '
* Most states only allow appeals for the denial of medically
necessary or E/I care, although nine states allow external review
for coverage, reimbursement or claims-related disputes.
" All states allow for expedited reviews in cases where a delay in
receiving services will cause severe harm or disability. These
expedited reviews provide decisions within twenty-four to
seventy-two hours.33
* Most states allow for retrospective review or external review
after services have been provided, but a few states will only
allow appeals if services have not been provided.34
* Most states mandate a series of steps that health plans must take
to inform beneficiaries about the availability of IMR and how
23, 1993); Corcoran v. United HealthCare, 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Studdert &
Gresenz, supra note 15, at 864.
28. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 16-18.
29. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17.
30. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
31. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 9; CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at
16.
32. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 9.
33. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
34. Id. at 17.
[Vol. 13
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and when to access the system. Typically, mandates include
information in certificates of coverage, benefit handbooks, and
letters of denial in the internal appeal process.35
* Most states do not charge an application fee, but fifteen states
charge a nominal fee. This fee is waived for those unable to
36
pay.
* Most states use independent review organizations ("IROs").
3 7
IROs are accredited by a national organization and/or meet
licensure requirements established by states. These
organizations recruit panels of providers who conduct reviews
and who meet established criteria reflecting expertise in specific
clinical areas. IROs are required to ensure that a reviewer has
appropriate expertise for specific matters and no conflict of
interest, such as institutional or health plan affiliations or past
history that might bias a review. Often state statutes require
reviewers in specialty areas to be randomly assigned.38
Typically, only one reviewer is assigned to medical necessity
reviews, although statutory provisions usually require three
independent reviewers for E/I care disputes. Twenty-seven
states have health plans choose the external review entity.
39
* Most states routinely employ de novo review of medical
necessity in their 1MR process irrespective of health plan
definitions, 40 and only seven states bind their reviewers to health
plan definitions of medical necessity. "Binding" is defined as
whether the health plan's denial of care is consistent with its own
protocols for deciding what is medically necessary and
appropriate. 41 Nevertheless, most plans do not define medical
necessity in their coverage certificates, and most state statutes do
not define medical necessity. Rather, statutes specify the type of
evidence based on professional standards, clinical guidelines and
medical literature to be reviewed, in order to give broad
discretion to an external reviewer in determining what is the best
medical care in a specific case. 42 As a result, presumptions in
35. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 10-11; CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7,
at 11.
36. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
38. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162(b)(1) (2002).
39. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 17.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 18-19.
42. Id. at 17-18.
2004]
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favor of health plan denials that have evolved in the common
law, requiring plaintiffs' lawyers to prove that plans are
arbitrary and capricious in the application of or in deviation
from their standards, have been neutralized in the IMR process.43
* Most states bind the health plan to the results of the IRO, 44 but
allow consumers to advance a judicial claim.
" Health plans are typically assessed across the board for the costs
of the IMR review system. Also, plans often pay for each review
in which they are specifically involved, irrespective of whether
the denial is upheld, modified or overturned. Only nine states do
not assess plans for the costs, one state has a volunteer reviewer
panel, and one state has the enrollee and the plan split the cost.45
In brief, the above elements comprise the IMR prototype emerging
across the states and these core elements serve as a benchmark for the
subsequent review of specific state systems.
III. IMPLEMENTATION AND VIABILITY OF IMR IN FOUR STATES
A. Introduction to Findings
In reviewing national experience with external review, several states
stand out for a variety of reasons: Minnesota, Michigan, California, and
Florida exemplify states with long track records for both managed care and
external review; New Mexico allows a filing of an external appeal at the
same time as an internal appeal to fast-track the system, and Connecticut,
California, New York, and Maryland have developed active Patient
Advocacy Units, HMO Help Centers, or Ombudsmen programs, which
offer unique consumer support; Pennsylvania, New York, California,
Florida, and Michigan have outstanding state oversight and reporting
capacity in place; and New York, California, and Texas are noteworthy for
their population size and high annual volume of cases. In addition, a
number of states are creating statute-based rights to sue health plans such as
breach of duty of ordinary care or duty to provide medically necessary
43. Conversations with John Blum, John J. Waldron Research Professor, Loyola School
of Law, and John Marren, Senior Partner, Hogan & Marren in Chicago, Illinois (Fall 2001).
See also Strain & Kinney, supra note 21, at 40. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber, 489
U.S. 101, 109-10 (1989).
44. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 25. See, e.g., 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162
(c)(6) (2002).
45. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 27.
[Vol. 13
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health care.46 The availability of these new causes of action broadens the
ability to bring a claim forward beyond that of traditional tort claims, such
as negligence, wrongful death, or vicarious liability or contract law claims
including bad faith or fraud. Because of their progressive approach, all of
the states above are promising laboratories for deeper exploration of IMR,
its implementation, its scope, its limitations, and its impact.
B. Methodology
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas were singled out for the
reasons described above; five of these states were pursued. Two attempts to
gain Florida's participation were made, including direct communication
with personnel in its Agency for Health Care Services. Ultimately,
however, Florida was excluded from the study when it became clear that
data from four states was generating sufficiently rich information about
IMR and that major themes from the four states were being repeated despite
remaining differences in state approaches. Therefore, it was presumed that
evidence from additional states would provide only marginal information to
characterize IMR. Consequently, original research focused on four states,
specifically, California, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.
Thereafter, specific state agencies which administer IMR were identified
from existing reports. Agency directors or program managers were
contacted via telephone, often identified by reception or hotline staff. A
telephone interview of sixty to ninety minutes was scheduled with staff who
either directed the program or were sufficiently familiar to provide detailed
information, for example, lead attorneys who drafted annual reports and
reviewed state data.
A discussion guide was developed to retrieve a standard set of
information across states. The questionnaire/discussion guide was divided
into three sections evaluating how the program works, how well it works,
and how it links to other remedies available to the consumer. The first
section focused on validating and updating information available from the
Kaiser47 and Consumer Union48 studies and emphasized how the remedy
worked for the consumer, the role of the parties, the various definitions of
medical necessity, and the nature of the problems coming up for review.
Section Two focused on emerging problems in the system from the
46. Id. at 28; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(a)(1) (2003). See also Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A.
Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield,
47 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 235, 235 (2003).
47. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 1.
48. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 1.
2004]
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viewpoint of state agency personnel-examining how the states were
refining the program, developing relationships with the health insurance
industry, and understanding the perceived impact on industry and
consumers. The last section of the questionnaire was devoted to clarifying
if, when, and how often consumers file a civil action while going through
external review or as a result of external review. Additionally, state
respondents were asked to identify any pending or anticipated legislative
change that would impact IMR. Statutory provisions were reviewed before
these interviews to capture the major configuration of each state's program
and its distinct features.
C. Study Findings
Interviews with personnel in this four-state survey provided an in-depth
view of IMR systems. Chart One summarizes the major features of the
IMR system in the four states.49 Discussion below amplifies the chart in the
following areas: (1) legislative history and program scope; (2) key IMR
features and trends; (3) nature of the dispute resolution process and roles of
key parties; (4) state oversight mechanisms; (5) definitions of medical
necessity; (6) impact on health plans; and (7) IMR links to subsequent
judicial action.
1. Legislative History
With the passage of the Health Maintenance Act in 1978, Michigan
signed its first external appeal law focused exclusively on HMOs.50 The
Act granted enrollees who exhausted a plan's grievance process the
opportunity to pursue the grievance further with a three-person advisory
commission.51 In 1997, the Michigan Bill of Patient's Rights Act passed,
thereby mandating that HMOs and other insurers establish internal formal
enrollee grievance procedures.52  The bill defined the term "adverse
determination, 5 3 a definition that remains in affect under the most recent
legislation, the Patients Rights and Independent Review Act ("PRIRA") of
2000.54 PRIRA repealed the HMO Act of 1978 and refined the external
appeal regimen under the jurisdiction of the Department of Insurance and
49. See Appendix A, Chart I.
50. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.21035 (1978) (current version at MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.2213). See Eric J. Wexler, A Patient's Right to Independent Review: Has Michigan's
Act Changed After Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran?, 81 MICH. B.J. 18, 19 (Nov. 2002).
51. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.21035.
52. Wexler, supra note 50, at 20.
53. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 550.1903(a) (2002).
54. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 550.1903.
[Vol. 13
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its Office of Financial and Insurance Services ("OFIS").
55
Pennsylvania's move toward managed care accountability dates back to
the HMO Act of 1972.56 This was followed by Health Department
regulations in the early 1980s and technical guidelines, which were further
refined in 1991. 57 In 1998, Pennsylvania passed Act 68, the Quality Health
Care Accountability and Protection Act.58 Act 68 redesigned the state's
consumer complaint system by establishing a new consumer and provider
grievance system, requiring the certification of utilization review
organizations, and providing other protections related to disclosures,
continuity of care, and prompt payment of claims. 59 New regulations were
promulgated in 2001 which fashioned the system that currently exists in
Pennsylvania under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health.60
New York has enacted a spate of laws addressing health insurance and
managed care consumer protections. 6' The Managed Care Reform Act of
1996 included many consumer protections, such as requiring access to
specialists, preserving continuity of care when a provider is no longer
participating in a network, formulating a prudent layperson standard for
emergency care, mandating disclosure of coverage information to
subscribers, prohibiting gag clauses in provider contracts, and requiring
health plans to have grievance procedures and a utilization review appeal
for disputes affecting access to care, referral to providers and benefit
55. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 550.1903-1925 (2002) (containing the legislative scheme for
PRIRA's prescribed internal and external review process). See also Michigan Newswire,
Michigan's Health Insurance Independent Review at Two Years, Nov. 6, 2002, available at
http://www.michigan.gov/minewswire.
56. E-mail from Stacy Mitchell, Dir., Bureau of Managed Care, Pa. Dep't of Health, to
Leatrice Berman-Sandler (May 29, 2003, 8:28:09 CST) (on file with author). KAISER
ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 4.
57. E-mail from Stacy Mitchell, Dir., Bureau of Managed Care, Pa. Dep't of Health, to
Leatrice Berman-Sandler (May 28, 2003, 16:42:36 CST) (on file with author).
58. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2102-2163 (2003) (articulating the key provisions of the
Quality Health Care Accountability and Protection Act as part of Title 40-Pennsylvania's
Insurance Code).
59. PA. CONSUMER COMPLAINTS & GRIEVANCES UNDER ACT 68, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS,
available at http://www.health.state.pa.us/QA/HMO/consumer.htm (last visited April 13,
2003) [hereinafter, "PENNSYLVANIA Q & A"].
60. 28 PA. CODE § 6-9-2001 (2003).
61. N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T & N.Y. STATE HEALTH DEP'T, EXTERNAL APPEAL PROGRAM
ANN. REP., JULY 1, 1999-JUNE 30, 2000, at Introductory Page (identifying additional
managed care and health insurance consumer protection legislation passed in New York,
such as the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1997, the Health Care Reform Act of
2000, Women's Health and Wellness Act of 2000, and the External Review Law of 1998),
available at www.nysenior.org/news/reports/extemal%
2 0appeal% 2 09 9 -OO.pdf [hereinafter
"N.Y. 2000 Report"].
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determinations. 62  The External Appeal Law of 1998 expanded these
protections 63 by adding a new title to Article 49 of the Insurance and Public
Health Law, thus enabling consumers to obtain an IMR if a plan upholds an
adverse medical necessity determination or an E/I treatment determination
after an internal appeal.64 The New York State Insurance Department and
Department of Health often jointly play major roles in implementing these
laws.
California has a long history of regulating managed care through the
Knox-Keene Act of 1975.65 Managed care plans, including some preferred
provider organizations ("PPOs"), are licensed under Knox-Keene and most
Californians (approximately twenty million) are insured under such plans.66
Knox-Keene historically provided only an informal process by which an
enrollee who was denied co-,erage could appeal to a health plan, and, if
unsatisfied with the result, could file a complaint with the state.67 Although
some health plans offered independent external review of denials, IMR was
not universal and there was no oversight. In 1996, the Friedman-Knowles
Act amended Knox-Keene and required HMOs to provide external IMRs
for specific classes of patients who requested E/I treatments and were
denied.68 Knox-Keene was further amended in 1998 to add the current
external appeal system for medically necessary care and administratively
integrated all IMRs including those for E/I care disputes. 69 The 1999
amendments also restructured the internal grievance process in an attempt
to standardize and broaden both internal reviews and eligibility for IMR.
62. N.Y. INS. Law §§ 4910, 4914 (2003) (key provisions granting the right to external
appeal and procedure s for external appeals of adverse health plan determinations).
63. N. Y. STATE INS. DEP'T & N. Y. STATE HEALTH DEP'T, External Appeal Program
Annual Report 3, July 1, 2000 - June 29, 2001, available at www.Ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/
extapp01 .pdf [hereinafter "N.Y. 2001 REPORT"].
64. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH & INS. LAW § 4914.
65. INST. FOR MED. QUALITY, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., INDEPENDENT MEDICAL
REVIEW EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA, (IMR) PHASE I: CASES OF
INVESTIGATION/EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS 1 (Sept. 2002), available at www.chcf.org/
documents/policy/IndMedicalReviewPhasel.pdf [hereinafter "IMR REPORT 2002"].
66. INST. FOR MED. QUALITY, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, INDEPENDENT MEDICAL
REVIEW EXPERIENCES IN CALIFORNIA, (IMR) PHASE II: CASES INCLUDING MEDICAL
NECESSITY 2 (Apr. 2003), available at www.chcforg/documents/policy/phaseIlIMR.pdf
[hereinafter "IMR REPORT 2003"].
67. Id. at 1; Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16; E-mail from Tom Gilevich,
Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Managed Health Care, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003,
18:23:15 CST) (on file with author).
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4; CAL. INS. CODE § 10145.3(a)(4) (1999).
69. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16; IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 1;
IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 1; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.30(d)(1)
(2003); 2001-39 CAL. Reg. L. Bull. (Sept. 28, 2001); CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 28, §§ 1300.68,
1300.68.01, 1300.70.4, & 1300.74.30.
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Unlike E/I care reviews, medical necessity reviews were no longer
contingent upon a physician recommendation for a certain service, but only
required that the patient had been seen by a physician, denied a service, and
participated in the plan's own internal grievance process for thirty days. 0
The Health Plan Division in the Department of Corporations, which
provided oversight for Knox-Keene plans, became the Department of
Managed Health Care ("DMHC") in California's Business, Transportation
and Housing Agency in July 2000.71 Note that the California Department
of Insurance ("DOI") continues to regulate traditional indemnity health
insurers and some preferred provider plans; thus, California's Insurance
72Code is a mirror-image of the Knox-Keene 1MR provisions.
2. Key IMR Features and Trends
All four states generally follow the prototype model described in Part II.
However, they reflect important differences in a variety of areas.73
a. Plans Subjected to IMR
Michigan, New York and California target all health plans with the major
exception of Medicare and employer-sponsored self-insured plans.
Pennsylvania's system is limited to managed care plans.74 All four states
make the external appeal process available to certain Medicaid
beneficiaries, although New York only makes external appeals available to
Medicaid Managed Care beneficiaries.75  However, all states inform
Medicaid beneficiaries of their rights to a Medicaid fair hearing; appeals
can be made directly to the state department administering that program so
that Medicaid enrollees have multiple avenues to appeal their rights.7 6
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13474.300)(3).
71. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16. California also established the HMO
Help Center which is a division of the DMHC and which handles complaints. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 1368.02 (2003).
72. The DOI manages approximately seventy IMRs per year compared to 700 or so
which come from Knox-Keene plans. The DOI uses the same contractors and follows the
same rules. See JOHN Q. REPORT, infra note 78.
73. See Interviews, see supra note 16.
74. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162(a) (2003).
75. E-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author). See also Interviews,
supra note 16.
76. PENNSYLVANIA Q&A, supra note 59; e-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney,
Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file
with author); e-mail from Tom Gilevich, Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Managed Health, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 18:23:15 CST) (on file with author). See also Interviews,
supra note 16.
2004]
13
Berman-Sandler: Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies to Achieve M
Published by LAW eCommons, 2004
Annals of Health Law
New York subjects all health care plans, including dental health plans, to
its IMR requirements. California IMR applies not only to comprehensive
medical plans, but also to mental health, pharmacy, and Preferred
Provider/Point of Service plans or networks considered adjunct to already
existing licensees under both Knox-Keene and the Insurance Code.77
Dental, chiropractic and vision care plans are exempt in California.
California's IMR mandate originally included disputes involving
Medicare+Choice plans, but the state health plan association filed suit,
successfully asserting federal law preempted Medicare enrollees from using
the state IMR system. 78 Michigan's IMR is used for all licensed health
insurers, HMOs, Alternative Finance and Delivery Systems which are
typically provider sponsored, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan.79
However, those insured by Medicare supplemental, disability income,
hospital indemnity, and specified accidental, credit, self-funded or long-
term care plans do not qualify for external reviews. 80 Therefore, many of
these insured groups are not eligible for IMR. This holds true in all four
states, although in New York, any hospital indemnity plan that conducts
utilization review would be subject to New York's external appeal law.81
b. Disputes Eligible for IMR
Pennsylvania, New York and California review only medical necessity
disputes and classify E/I cases as a sub-category of medical necessity
cases.82  Michigan has the most expansive review authority. With the
exception of cases involving clear, statutorily valid coverage exclusions and
cancellations of coverage, Michigan will review all health plan denials for
care or coverage. Conversely, California limits its reviews to care disputes
that arise before care is actually received with the exception of disputes
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1345(f), (o) (2003); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1374.30 (b), (i) (2003) (defining qualifying health plans and language regarding what
type of health care service contracts must meet grievance and IMR requirements).
78. Cal. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Zingale, No. 00-06803, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21497
(Cal. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 2001); CAL. DEP'T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, THE CAL. HMO HELP
CENTER ANN. REP. 2001: JOHN Q. DOESN'T LIVE HERE ANYMORE 50 (June 2002), available
at www.hmohelp.ca.gov/library/reports/complaint/2001.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2003)
[hereinafter "JOHN Q. REPORT"].
79. Michigan Newswire, supra note 55.
80. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 550.1903(s) (2002) (defining health carrier). Exclusions were
confirmed in interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
81. See e-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to
Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author).
82. Interviews, supra note 16; e-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health
Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with
author). Specific distinctions are found in statute and are referenced throughout this report.
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83over emergency and urgent care.
c. Access Hurdles: Pre-Required
Internal Health Plan Reviews
A review of only four states demonstrates the problem of access and the
diversity of state-based pre-requisites for an IMR. The states differ on
whether patients must first exhaust health plan internal appeals processes
before requesting external review from the state. Specifically, Michigan
and Pennsylvania require exhaustion of health plans' internal appeals
processes.
Although all of these states require grievances to go through at least
some level of internal review, Pennsylvania's system has health plans
determine if disputes are deemed either complaints or grievances, a critical
state statutory distinction.84 A complaint is defined as a dispute or
objection regarding a participating health care provider or coverage issue,
including contract exclusions, limitations, non-covered benefits, and
operations and management issues.85 Complaints can be filed orally or in
writing with a plan, or by a provider with written consent of a patient.
86
After a two-step review at the plan level in Pennsylvania, decisions on
complaints can be appealed to the Department of Health or the Insurance
Department depending on the nature of the complaint. Unless there is gross
negligence brought to the attention of the state in the assignation,
87
complaints are not eligible for external review.
As distinguished from a complaint, a grievance is a request by an
enrollee or a health care provider, with the consent of the enrollee, to have a
managed care plan review the denial of a health care service based on
medical necessity and appropriateness.88 Only grievances are subject to
external review; however, similar to complaints, they are initially appealed
in a two-step internal review, after which they can be externally appealed.
In Pennsylvania, this appeal is made directly to the plan, unlike the other
three states where an IMR request is made directly to the state.89
Nevertheless, the Department of Health assigns the case to a certified IRO.
Moreover, Pennsylvania requires patients to act within shorter time frames;
83. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.300) (2003).
84. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 991.2102, 992.2161 (2003).
85. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 991.2102, 992.2161.
86. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2102; PENNSYLVANIA Q&A, supra note 59, at Question 2.
87. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
88. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 991.2102; PENNSYLVANIA Q&A, supra note 59, at Question
2.
89. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162 (2003).
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enrollees must appeal within fifteen days of a denial. 90 Pennsylvania's
enrollees can request expedited two-day internal reviews with a plan, but
there are no expedited appeals at the external level. 9 1 In other words,
expedited appeals are not reviewed by the state at a "third" level, but rather
go straight to an IRO, which is required to issue an expedited decision in
two business days. 9 2 By contrast, in Michigan, after a multi-step appeal
leading to a final determination, a patient may file directly with the state. 93
In New York, patients need only go through their health plan's first level
of appeal as a pre-requisite to seeking an IMR. 94 New York will also accept
applications after an initial health plan denial if the insured and the health
plan agree to waive the next level of internal appeal.95 Patients more
typically submit to the state's IMR when their case is pending at a second
level of plan review.9 6 Thus, due in part to these concurrent tracks, an
appeal making its way through a health plan is eligible for review at the
state level after an initial determination. Consequently, 259 cases were
dismissed in 2000 while in the state's IMR queue as a result of health plans
reversing earlier denials based on additional information made available to
the plan during the state's external appeal process. 97 Indeed, in New York,
if patients attempt to exhaust the internal appeal process, they may miss the
forty-five day time limit in which they must act to file an external appeal
after an initial denial.98 This timeframe begins to run after the first health
plan determination. If patients obtain an agreement from their health plan
to waive the internal appeal process altogether, a letter to this effect serves
as a final determination paving the way for an external appeal.99 Last, if a
health plan misses the statutory deadline for responding to an internal
appeal, the health service must be covered by the health plan and the
90. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162; CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 60.
91. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2161(e).
92. 28 PA.CODE § 9.709(k) (2003).
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 550.1907, 550.1911 (2002).
94. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914 (2003).
95. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16.
96. E-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author) (noting that not all plans
have a second level of review); interviews with Judy Doyle and Kristin 0' Neill, supra note
16.
97. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 24.
98. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16; KAISER ASSESSMENT,
supra note 7, at 12.
99. N.Y. 2001 Report, supra note 63; e-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney,
Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file
with author).
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external appeal becomes unnecessary. 00
Similarly, California will allow the patient to jump into the state's IMR
program either after completing a grievance process as prescribed by state
law or by participating in the grievance process for at least thirty days
without resolution.'0 ' California provides the most generous timeframe
under which a patient can file for an IMR or appeal any grievance
determination.'0 2 However, based on a sample of one-quarter of all patients
who have gone through the IMR process seeking medical necessity review
since 1999, 60% reported that they did not know when the clock started or
stopped on this required thirty-day time period. 0 3 Slightly less than 50% of
patients from the same sample reported that their health plan notified them
of their eligibility for an external review at the thirty-day mark; 27% of
patients reported that they were never notified. '04
d. Trends in Volume and Access
Chart Two compares data reported in the Kaiser reports and directly by
states with more recent information received through this study. 10 5 Trends
suggest increasing consumer use of external appeals within the last two
years, but also suggest a leveling off in the larger states, such as New York
and California. 106 As a benchmark, the Kaiser Family Foundation and the
American Association of Health Plans report that states with IMR systems
average about .7 reviews per 10,000 enrollees and range from .2 to 1.7 per
10,000 members. 10 7 Among the four states reviewed in this study, annual
statistics are lowest for Pennsylvania. This may reflect that the external
review application process is directly managed by health plans. However,
100. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4904(e) (2003); see also CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7,
at 53.
101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(1)(A) (2003).
102. CONSUMER UNION GUIDE, supra note 7, at 25. See also Appendix A, Chart I
(listing timeframes).
103. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 14.
104. Id.
105. Data from New York and California largely comes from reports published by the
states or through telephone interviews. New York data is located in the following sources:
N.Y. 2001 Report, supra note 63; N.Y. 2000 Report, supra note 61; N.Y. CONSUMER GUIDE
To HEALTH INSURERS, 2002, available at www.ins.state.ny.us/hgintro.htm [hereinafter "N.Y.
CONSUMERS GUIDE 2002"]. California data is located in the following sources: JOHN Q.
REPORT, supra note 78; IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65; IMR REPORT 2003, supra note
66. Collectively, these reports will hereinafter be referred to as "Reports."
106. See Appendix B, Chart II with data sources included.
107. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at vii (reporting a New York rate of 10.7 cases
per 100,000 managed care insureds/enrollees). See also JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at
51 (reporting that California's average is approximately .35 per 10,000).
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despite the low average, overall use of IMR in Pennsylvania has more than
doubled in the last two years, including an increasing number of provider
appeals.108 Furthermore, Pennsylvania staff reports increased promotion of
IMR through a revised web site, new brochure, and grass roots outreach to
consumer groups. 10 9 Likewise, use of IMR in Michigan doubled between
year one, just after the PRIRA legislation went into effect, and year two.110
Therefore, both the number of applications for dispute resolution and the
number of cases being determined in both Michigan and Pennsylvania have
increased from prior reporting periods.11
In the larger states, New York and California, the annual rate of increase
for IMR applications and determinations appears to be stabilizing or going
down, but the absolute number of annual applications are rising slightly.
12
Recent trends follow a concerted jump in applications attributable to the
new IMR legislation. Additionally, outreach and promotion of the IMR
benefit is ongoing in these states.1 13
In 2001, California's HMO Help Center provided help to 179,966
individuals. 14 About 67,000 of these calls were either from providers or
were for general information, resolved through the digital interactive voice
response system.1 15 Several thousand additional calls involved resolving
problems on the spot with the support of patients rights representatives (905
calls) or required handling by clinical staff (1133 calls). An additional 4740
formal complaints raised issues of coverage, denial of payment, access,
quality of care, billing and disputes over health care services; of these, 723
complaints, or 15%, went into the IMR system in 2001 and approximately
108. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, Pennsylvania, supra note 16.
109. Id.
110. See Appendix B, Chart 11.
111. Id..
112. Id.; IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65; IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66; JOHN Q.
REPORT, supra note 78, at 51.
113. See N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 4, 13 (noting that New York provides a
toll free hotline to help consumers file external appeal requests; information and applications
are posted on the web site of both Insurance and Health departments; brochures describing
the system are disseminated; both departments have participated in information meetings
with health plans, providers and consumer groups and staff are available on weekends and
holiday to handle expedited requests). See also JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 41
(stating that California has conducted outreach to providers through medical groups and
associations; specialty cancer treatment centers; employer and consumer groups and
rehabilitation providers; and PT, mental health and chemical dependency providers).
California has an extensive website, provides newsletter articles, brochures and posters, and
works with health plans to incorporate IMR information on their home pages. Id. See also
Appendix B, Chart II.
114. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 3.
115. Id.
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113 of these were withdrawn or resolved while being processed.' 16
Therefore, only 610 cases in California were sent to independent review in
2001.17 Thus, in the final analysis, 13% of formal complaints completed
IMR.
Since New York started its IMR program in June of 1999, it has received
approximately 16,000 calls (5200 calls in year one, 3800 calls in year two,
and over 6500 calls from July 2001 to December 2002) on the state's
external appeal hotline; however, not all calls were directly related to
external appeal. Of these calls, 1405 actual requests for IMR were made in
year one, 1675 in year two, and 2128 from July 2001 to December 2002,
which is equal to an estimated comparable twelve-month rate of 1418 calls.
Altogether of the 16,000 calls, 5208 translated to actual IMR requests, or
33% of all calls received. 1 8  In light of rejection rates for incomplete
applications or applications ineligible for review, 2971, or 52%, of requests
resulted in a completed review. When coupled with an additional 722
appeals reversed by health plans while cases were pending, almost 71% of
appeal requests have had complete determinations in New York's IMR
program since its inception, comprising approximately 23% of all calls
coming into the external appeal hotline.' 19
The Kaiser Foundation reports that external review requests are
winnowed down to fewer actual requests because of lack of public
awareness, the length of the internal and external appeal processes, filing
fees, filing deadlines, claims thresholds, and limits on types of cases
eligible for external review, all of which create barriers to access.120 Some
of these factors are at work in these four states. Other industry experts
attribute low numbers to a lack of consumer awareness that reviews and
appeals are an option, as well as a lack of information about how to
apply.12 1  Yet other analysts suggest that the "paucity of upper level
appeals" within the health plan internal appeal process, to which IMR is
often linked, could either "reflect satisfaction with first-level decisions" or
116. Id.at35.
117. Id.at36.
118. See Appendix B, Chart II for updated data from New York through the end of
December 2002, which marked the three and one-half year mark for the program. Although
the program is growing at a steady rate, the annual growth rate has leveled off.
119. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS. & DEP'T OF HEALTH, N. Y. STATE EXTERNAL APPEAL
PROGRAM 2002 at 9, 14 (JULY 2001-DEC. 2002); N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 9-10,
29; e-mail from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author).
120. KAISER ASSESSEMENT, supra note 7, at 10-14.
121. Travis Ketterman, The Supreme Court Endorses the Right to Second Opinions for
HMO Participants, 91 ILL. B.J. 66, 92 (2003).
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that enrollees are simply worn down by the process and reticent to press
on.122
A recent study in California of patients who used IMR confirmed some
of these suggestions.1 23 The report indicated that patients are stalled in the
grievance process on their way to IMR. 124  Less than half of patient
respondents reported that their health plan followed timeframes set by
statute. Patients also do not track timeframes, thus staying in the internal
grievance process much longer than needed. 125 Patient surveys indicate that
many people go through multiple internal appeal levels before they realize
that IMR is an option.126 Specifically, California's study indicates that two-
122. Studdert & Gresenz, supra note 15.
123. California commissioned two studies to look at program implementation and
impact. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65; IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 2. The most
recent survey of IMR participants during 2001 had a consumer response rate of 25% among
IMR participants, 49% among their physicians and sampled health plans representing 94%
of all reviews performed. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66. Consumers in the study went
through the IMR process from 1999-2001. The two studies obtained the subjective
impression of participants. Id.; IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65. The recent report
attempted to compare how impressions changed in 2001, when DMHC assumed
responsibility for handling IMRs in California. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 10.
While the 2001 respondents disproportionately represented those who were successful in the
IMR process, the study revealed that despite the major revamping and promotion of
California's system, patient awareness "remained essentially unchanged" from 2000 to 2001.
Id. This was not an adequate timeframe for evaluating change in the system, but the report
concluded that targeting patients with information before they are in a position to consider
IMR for themselves may have little impact. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 2. Less
than one-third of patients said the DMHC helped them understand the IMR process, despite
California's sophisticated system. Id. at 18. Likewise, in the 2001 survey, patients going
through the state-based E/I review system reported in greater numbers that information was
not available to them early in their process, nor did they receive enough support in mounting
their case and submitting information for the IMR. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 10-
15. Although new regulations allowed them to move directly to a State review, they did not
know their rights. Id. at 33-34. Last, patients report wanting direct contact with the IRO.
IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 5. Comments included being able to call to ask
questions or verify that correct information has been received and being able to participate
through a hearing process where they could be physically present. Id. In response to these
findings, the DMHC has tried to conduct information campaigns for consumers, providers
and others about the availability of IMR. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16. In
2002, the Department contacted 878 organizations to promote the IMR system, held a
provider-focused outreach campaign, and developed a dedicated IMR web page on the
DMHC Web site. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 35.
124. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 35.
125. California data from the IMR 2003 Report confirms that of the grievances received
in its internal process, plans overturned their denials on average 40-50% of the time, and
many cases eligible for IMR dissipate to less than 100 cases per plan per year. IMR REPORT
2003, supra note 66, at 36. Because California does not accept IMR requests if services are
already rendered (with the exception of urgent and emergency care), this also substantially
reduces IMR requests from PPO patients. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
126. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 33-35.
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thirds of patients were not aware of IMR before they used it, and very few
physicians knew about it before one of their patients used it.127 Targeting
patients with information before they are in a position to consider IMR for
themselves seems to have little impact.1 28 This is negative news for recent
state initiatives to promote IMR. On the other hand, broad education in the
general public and promotion in health plan and insurance materials may be
helpful in creating better public awareness about IMR and word of mouth
support at the point when a patient needs advice about disputing denial of
care.
In sum, there is a tremendous funneling effect both within health plans
and from health plans to state-based IMR, as the number of eligible
candidates who actually complete the review process is contrasted to the
number of requests for IMR per year. Although there have been gains in
the IMR process, there are also barriers, specifically that patients may not
fully understand their rights. 2 9 Therefore, states may need to implement
more effective ways to reach patients about such rights in order to make
expectations clearer and provide tools for patients to move through the
grievance process more effectively.' 
30
e. Eligibility for IMR
As seen from the above data, part of the funneling effect comes from
statutory exclusions.'31 The biggest reason for rejecting applications in
New York is patient or provider ineligibility. Twenty-seven percent of
127. id. at3.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Additionally, California's IMR Reports suggest that two-thirds of beneficiaries
sampled were not aware that the IMR was an independent system and that the medical
experts used had no significant financial interest or bias toward the health plan, provider or
medical facility. Furthermore, a majority of beneficiaries also did not know whether the
health plan played a role in selecting the reviewer. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 10,
14.
130. Recommendations from recent California reports suggest that the state might
benefit from rethinking how patients receive IMR applications, specifically for E/I patients.
Patients disputing the denial of an experimental treatment typically do not exhaust their
internal process, so they do not receive notice about the availability of appealing to the
state's IMR system; likewise, they do not directly receive an application from the health
plan. Other ideas being considered by the state include: developing "How To" books to
assist with both promotion of IMR and to help patients get through the process; increased
monitoring of health plans; and strengthening the transparency and involvement of patients,
physicians and health plans in the review process. The report also stated a need to further
study how cultural or language differences might impact patient experiences in reaching
IMR. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 34-36. See also IMR REPORT 2002, supra note
65, at 20-23.
131. See supra text Part III.C.2.a-d.
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rejections stem from patients having ineligible insurance, for example those
who are self-insured or who are covered by Medicare, out-of-state
insurance coverage, federal employee benefits, automobile insurance, or
workers compensation. 132 Moreover, 25% of applications are incomplete
and remain so even after two requests from state agency personnel. In
addition, another 16% of applicants miss the forty-five day time limit after a
health plan denial and another 16% of applications dispute coverage or
contractual issues, not medical necessity.'33  In California, where
timeframes are more liberal, IMR applications are rejected largely because
health plan members are raising reimbursement issues which comprise 33%
of all applications, or coverage issues which comprise 28% of
applications. 34 Only 19% of applications are turned away because patients
have not completed internal health plan appeals or applications remained
incomplete.
35
In sum, the IMR process reflects the fact that state regulators, with the
exception of Michigan, did not intend external review for all health plan
denials. Rather, the IMR is exclusively focused on medical treatment
questions, which contributes greatly to the funneling affect faced by this
dispute resolution system.
f Frequent Disputes, E/I vs. Medical
Necessity, Expedited vs. Standard
The most frequent disputes center around routine patient care issues such
as length of hospital stays; durable medical equipment, for example electric
versus manual wheelchairs; and pharmaceuticals, such as brand versus
generic.136 The majority of medical necessity cases in New York in 2000
focused on requests for coverage of surgical services, inpatient and
outpatient mental health care, and inpatient hospital length of stay. 137
132. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 23. Ineligible provider appeals (127
rejections) are included in the twenty-seven percent figure. Health care providers only have
a limited right to request an external appeal in New York. They may request an external
appeal of a retrospective final adverse determination; therefore, if the initial utilization
review was prospective (before treatment) or concurrent (while treatment was being
rendered), the health care provider would be ineligible to request an external appeal. E-mail
from Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice Berman-
Sandier (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author).
133. N.Y. 2000 REPORT, supra note 61, at 22, 27; N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at
29-30.
134. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 32.
135. An additional eight percent of accepted applications are reversed by health plans
while in the IMR process. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 32.
136. Summary statement based on Interviews, supra note 16, and all reports.
137. N.Y. 2000 REPORT, supra note 61, at 32
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During 2001, while these disputes were still most prevalent, there were
increases in pharmaceutical and ancillary therapy services, such as
chiropractic care. 38 Commonly disputed conditions and procedures include
bariatric surgery, such as gastric bypass surgery for obesity; cosmetic
surgery, such as breast reductions; oral-maxillofacial procedures including
temporomandibular jaw surgery, and dental procedures such as crowns,
implants, and dentures; interdisc-electrothermal therapy; physical therapy;
and custodial care, specifically the use of occupational and physical therapy
in the home setting. 39
In California medical necessity cases, prescription drug therapy,
cosmetic or reconstructive surgery, other surgical procedures, durable
medical equipment and specialist referrals comprised the bulk of disputes.
In addition, obesity, morbid obesity, back pain, cancer, and arthritis were
the most frequently noted diagnoses. In E/I reviews, prescription drug
therapy and interdiscal-electrothermal therapy for back pain were the most
frequently disputed procedures, while musculoskeletal complaints and
cancer care were the most frequent diagnoses. 140  The off-label use of
prescription drugs is also included within the scope of E/I in most states. 141
Experimental or investigational applications, by definition, require more
supportive documentation and are reviewed according to more rigorous
scientific criteria. 42 The number of E/I applications differ across the four
states studied; these differences may reflect distinct provider cultures. Of
the cases brought forward, 7-8% of cases reviewed in both New York and
Michigan are E/I, while 25% of cases in California are E/I. 143 Historically,
California only accepted E/I requests for external review, which may
explain why California activity is greater in this area.' 44  Moreover,
California personnel report that there is no uniformity in how health plans
label E/I versus medical necessity cases within the state.
45
There is also variation across the states in differentiating expedited from
standard reviews. Of total reviews in California, 15% are expedited
138. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 46.
139. Interviews, supra note 16.
140. JoH-N Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 43-46.
141. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 8.
142. Id. at 53.
143. There is no obvious reason for this discrepancy. Historically, California only
reviewed E/I cases, and it may be that medical necessity disputes are just now being
recognized as eligible. See Reports, supra note 105. See also Interview with Paul Duguay,
supra note 16, providing information on the Michigan statistics.
144. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 1.
145. Id. at 53.
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compared to New York, where only 6-7% of appeals are expedited. 46
Moreover, in California, 45% of E/I reviews are expedited, compared to 6%
of medical necessity reviews.
41
g. Overturn Rates
There is heightened focus on reversal rates, also called overturn rates, as
a result of IMR. 14 8 In this four state sample, the variance in reversal, or
overturn, rates is not large-32-45% of health plan decisions are either
overturned or modified.149  Nationally, consumers are successful in the
external review about half of the time, although the variation across states is
much greater, ranging from 21% in Arizona and Minnesota to 72% in
Connecticut.150 This wide range reflects both state size, reporting artifacts,
and unique state characteristics.' 5'
Compared to overall reversal rates, overturn rates for E/I cases are lower
in all states in this sample. New York personnel note that some health plans
consult outside experts when rendering E/I determinations, so that plan
decisions may be pre-reviewed by an outside agency before they reach the
state. 52 Additionally, prior IMR decisions also have had some impact on
changing health plan protocols in the E/I area. Yet, E/I reversal rates
continue to vary across states.'53  As a result of these variations, the
National IRO Organization is interested in developing data collection
techniques and data repositories for the purpose of developing national
benchmarks and comparisons across states to standardize outcomes. 154
3. The Nature of IMR as a Dispute Resolution
Process and the Role of Key Parties
The IMR procedure is largely a paper process and is typically a clinical
146. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 51-53.
147. Id. at 48; N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 51-53. Data by type of review was
not available in the N.Y. 2000 Report.
148. See Appendix B, Chart II.
149. Id.
150. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at vi, 3.
151. Id. at 3 .
152. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16; e-mail from Kristin
O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y, DOI, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7,
2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author). See also N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at
46.
153. In New York, forty percent of E/I cases are overturned. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra
note 63, at 47. In California, eighteen percent of E/I are reversed. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra
note 78, at 4.
154. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
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review of the situation at issue. 55  Even the Moran Court dubbed it a
"second-opinion," as the review and determination is made by a physician
reviewing an existing record. 156 Physician reviewers are chosen for their
relevant expertise, and the evidence collected is limited to the patient's
medical record and other material submitted by a health plan, patient, and
the treating physician. The review itself is not a formal legal adjudication
involving the collection of evidence, discovery, or a hearing.157 Instead,
IMR looks like a consumer protection and complaint system where a state
agency using an adjunct, independent medical reviewer, assesses whether a
health plan has followed prescribed regulatory conduct. The review of
conduct includes elements of procedural due process for the handling of
internal complaints and grievances; 8 disclosure and communication of key
information about coverage, benefits, and reasons for denial of care; and
how beneficiaries can subsequently apply for external review.
59
By design, the external review remedy employs limited fact-finding and
discovery. The IMR reviewer works independently, typically on contract
with an IRO. This organization holds a contract with a state to make an
assessment of the medical facts in light of clinical evidence, national
standards of care, and a specific patient's needs. With the medical record
and the medical literature, the IRO reviewer decides whether care is
medically necessary or appropriate. The reviewer submits findings to the
state, and the health or insurance commissioner is authorized to accept or
reject the determination, providing the disputing parties with the reviewer's
rationale and background materials as requested. 60  Nevertheless, IMR
looks to some reviewers like a stripped-down and informal version of
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). The Moran Court, in fact,
vigorously debated whether IMR is an alternative dispute mechanism
because IMR involves states conducting an arbitration-like weighing of
facts and circumstances that is binding on the health plan. 16  Yet unlike
ADR, all parties, particularly the patient, can move forward into court if
desired. In a few jurisdictions, parties can enter into formal arbitration after
IMR should it be necessary.
62
Furthermore, IMR is quite different from the agency-based adjudicative
155. Interviews, supra note 16.
156. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 383 (2002).
157. Interviews, supra note 16; Reports, supra note 105.
158. Interviews, supra note 16.
159. Id.
160. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 163-179.
161. See infra Part V. See Moran, 536 U.S. at 394-96 (Thomas J., dissenting).
162. Infra Part III.C.7, Links to Subsequent Judicial Action or Suit.
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system, which typically involves an administrative hearing and appeal
before an Administrative Law Judge. 163  Even though hearings are not
incorporated within the state's external review process, some states mandate
that health plans hold hearings at the second appeal level, while other states
give plans discretion to hold hearings as needed.' 64  Specifically,
Pennsylvania mandates that a hearing take place before a grievance
committee. 165 Pennsylvania estimates that consumers participate eighty to
ninety percent of the time at such grievance hearings either by telephone or
in person. 166 New York mandates only one level of internal appeal review
before a patient can request an external appeal so that hearings are held at
the discretion of the plan.' 67  Michigan does not mandate an in-person
hearing for the internal review process, but staff estimates that hearings,
including conference calls, are used in thirty percent of cases or less. 1
68
a. Role of JROs and State Staff
The need for independent review has increased over the last five years
and several IROs dominate the industry, holding major contracts across the
country. 169 The quality of the reviews and qualifications of the reviewers
have improved, have enhanced the credibility of the IMR process, and have
increased the level of satisfaction within state government. 170 In each state,
there is an interface between state agency staff and IROs and a pre-review
of all appeals to differentiate contract and coverage disputes from medical
necessity disputes. 171 State agency personnel working with patients, health
plans, and providers check files for eligibility and completeness and then
send them out for IRO determinations.
172
In Michigan, where most denials by law are subject to external appeal,
163. Judge Joyce Krutick Craig, Managed Care Grievance Procedures: The Dilemma
and the Cure, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 336, 398-404 (Fall 2001); interview with
Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
164. Interviews, supra note 16.
165. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2161(c)(2) (2003) (mandating that a managed care plan
shall establish a grievance process which includes a second level review that includes a
"written notification to the enrollee or the health care provider of the right to appear before
the second level review committee").
166. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
167. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16.
168. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
169. Interviews, supra note 16. For example, Michigan has three IROs on contract, but
only uses two. However, two more potential contractors are bidding on the business.
Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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contractual claims must be separated out because such claims are not sent to
IROs.173 These contract-based appeals are handled directly by staff analysts
and legal counsel in Michigan's Office of Financial and Insurance Services
("OFIS"). Specific contractual claims, particularly complicated payment
and contractual matters requiring medical interpretation, are sent to external
review.114  After the IRO decision, the DOI routinely reviews all
determinations. The Commissioner of Insurance ultimately has authority
and can reject an IRO determination; however, ninety-eight percent of IRO
determinations are accepted.
175
In New York, external appeal applicants often present issues not eligible
for review, such as disputes about the use of out-of-network providers.
These appeals are sent to the Consumer Services Bureau of the New York
DOI and are handled as consumer complaints. 176 Department of Insurance
analysts further review applications to determine whether a health plan is
subject to the external appeal law, whether the application is complete, and
whether the patient or provider has conformed to required timelines.1
77
Insurance department attorneys are also available to sort out health plan
denials based on medical necessity or E/I, from coverage and other types of
complaints that are not eligible for external appeal. Eligible appeals are
then randomly assigned to IROs.1
78
Similarly, in California's Department of Managed Health Care
("DMHC"), attorneys review all coverage and termination of benefits
disputes, including payment disputes frequently related to out-of-network
care. 179 Legal staff has the authority to issue binding orders to health plans
and enrollees on these matters, as well as prepare files for IMR. 8 °
California has three IROs on contract, but uses one firm as its primary
contractor.' 8 ' Single reviewers are used in medical necessity disputes, but
the Department has discretion to request more than one reviewer for
complicated or high profile disputes or when there is concern for clinical
specialty-based bias. 82 Three reviewers are assigned for reviews involving
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
176. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16; e-mail from Kristin
O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y. DOI, to Leatrice-Berman Sandler (Oct. 7,
2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author).
177. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16.
178. N.Y. INS. LAW & N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 4914(1)(a) (2003).
179. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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E/I services. 83
b. Role of Physicians
As a matter of statutory law, physicians must be involved in certifying
the need for E/I reviews and for expedited reviews. 8 4 Expedited review
requires attestation that severe imminent harm or disability is at stake for a
patient. 85 However, standard reviews for medical necessity do not require
physician participation unless physicians, with written consent from
patients or families, are applying on behalf of patients, 86 and the general
consensus is that physician participation is sub-optimal.
IMRs benefit greatly from physician involvement; physicians enhance
the quality and thoroughness of materials prepared and some state
respondents reported disappointment that physicians are not more
frequently and more directly involved as patient advocates. 87 California
staff reports that fewer than half of the physicians are active in the
preparation of IMR cases; approximately 50% of the physicians were
informed and knew that their patient had initiated an IMR, and only 27% of
the physicians reported that they had all of the information necessary to
assist their patients during an IMR.188  Furthermore, 35% of those
physicians sampled who had patients involved in reviews reported that they
did not know the outcome of the review. 89 This lack of involvement and
advocacy on behalf of patients was cited as one of the major areas of
disappointment in California with respect to II4R. 190 Therefore, despite
183. Id.
184. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 28, § 1300.74.30(d)(4) (2003) (certifying expedited review);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4.30(a)(2) (2003) (certifying that the enrollee has a
condition for which standard therapies have not been effective); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
550.1907(3)(a), 550.1913(1)(a) (2002) (certifying expedited review); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH §
4914(2)(c)(2003) (certifying expedited review) and § 4910(2)(b) (certifying need for
experimental treatment).
185. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 28, § 1300.74.30 (d)(4); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
550.1913(1)(a); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 4914(2)(c); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2161(e)
(2003).
186. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30 (j), (m)(3) (2003); N.Y. INS. LAW §
4810(2) (2003); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 4914(2)(a); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(a)
(2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 550.1907(3)(a)(ii).
187. Interviews with Stacy Mitchell, Judy Doyle, and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16.
188. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 22.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Although there are sample surveys in California that quantify and focus on the
rather disappointing lack of physician involvement, respondents from three of the four states
interviewed echoed similar disappointment at the inconsistent level of involvement and the
untapped resources of physicians for assisting health plan members mount appeals.
Interviews, supra note 16.
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outreach to professional associations and medical groups in all of the states,
physicians appear less engaged in the external appeal process than is
preferred by state government personnel. 191
Moreover, treating physicians report that they want to be more involved
with the review, and specifically, with the IRO reviewer.192
Recommendations from California studies suggest that physicians would
like to be notified if their patient is in IMR and when the review has been
initiated. 93 They want to receive more feedback and explanation regarding
decisions and rationale as well as better access to the reviewer in order to
discuss the case. 194 Physicians would like to see a more open and broad
review process, including the consideration of more updated information
and the use of more appropriate experts. 195 However, it is not clear that
these are the correct ideas, as greater involvement of treating and health
plan physicians might bias reviews. 96  Data on physician behavior, as
gleaned from state officials and special studies, provide mixed messages on
how involved physicians want to be. 197  It is reasonable, however, to
conclude that physicians are not adequately engaged. 9
8
c. Role of Attorneys
Patients are able to use representatives or attorneys in both internal and
external appeals, but they rarely do. 199 Attorneys are not required to access
the process and respondents report that few patients wish to spend the
money unless they have secured family or pro-bono assistance. °0 State
respondents estimate that attorneys are involved in less than five percent of
cases which come before the agencies. 20 Attorneys do tend to get involved
191. Id.
192. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 40-41, 44.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 41.
195. Id. at 4.
196. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 5.
197. Interviews, supra note 16.
198. Naturally, both physician and consumer satisfaction with the IMR process is highly
correlated to the outcome of the reviews. California's studies also suggest that IMR reviews
have less impact on physician practices. Only six percent of doctors interviewed
reconsidered the efficacy of treatments they recommended based on the IMR review. IMR
REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 4. Health plans also would like more information on the
rationale of decisions if one purpose or byproduct of IMR is to have influence over future
medical policy or coverage decisions. Id.
199. Interviews, supra note 16.
200. Id.
201. Interviews with Tom Gilevich and Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
2004]
29
Berman-Sandler: Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies to Achieve M
Published by LAW eCommons, 2004
Annals of Health Law
when big-ticket items are at stake,2 °2 but because legal representation is so
infrequent, it is hard to assess if attorney representation is outcome
determinative.
In sum, IMR legislative reforms attempt to standardize and develop
consumer responsive processes which do not require formal legal support
and which mitigate the need to go to court. The internal grievance hearing
and the IMR process are not considered legal proceedings. Given the
nature of the process, attorneys are not needed, except in complicated cases
in which significant dollars are at stake or in cases when health plans refuse
to comply with a binding decision. In those cases, patients retain attorneys
to either threaten or proceed to court.
20 3
d Role of Health Plans
New York staff summed up the role and reactions of the managed care
industry across the country as being generally responsive and compliant.2 4
Plans administrators appreciate the IMR program and the input it provides,
follow its results, and are apt to make adjustments to their systems in
20response. °5 Pennsylvania staff reported that complaints from plans initially
focused on onerous notice and procedural requirements, such as mandated
internal grievance hearings, 206 but health plans have since adjusted to these
and similar requirements. Plans have institutionalized statutory mandates
related to both internal and external procedures and they fund the system
207through special assessments or payment for specific reviews.
California data, on the other hand, reveal that, although adjusted, not all
health plans are compliant.20 8 For example, plans in California do not
always follow patient notification requirements as specified in the law.
Although health plans report high levels of compliance with results, a
number of patients report significant difficulty obtaining approved services
after IMR reverses a health plan's decision.20 9 Moreover, the states do not
consistently track health plan compliance with the results of an IMR, but
rather most non-compliant cases come to the state's attention through the
202. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16. For example, an attorney was
involved in the development of an external appeal involving adolescent anorexia where the
dispute involved expensive institutional care.
203. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
204. Interview with Judy Doyle and Kristin O'Neill, supra note 16.
205. Id.
206. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
207. See Appendix A, Chart I.
208. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 11, 16; IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at
4.
209. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 4.
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enrollee.210 However, plans have accepted IMR protocols and IRO review
standards and today health plans are called upon to play extensive roles in
the internal review and notification process. In Pennsylvania, health plans
manage the external appeal directly including the application process. 21 In
California, plans are proactive in facilitating E/I appeals to get an objective
third party opinion; thirty-three percent of E/I reviews in California were
initiated by plans in 1999 and 2000. 212 Such examples of buy-in and
support co-exist with cited examples of non-compliance.
e. Ombudsmen Functions
Although none of the four states evaluated have formal ombudsmen
programs to shepherd consumers through the process, they do provide a
mix of similar support. Pennsylvania has no formal program in its Bureau
of Managed Care, but the Department of Health ("DOH") regulations
require plans to assign disinterested staff persons to help enrollees get
organized and prepare for internal plan hearings, which are prerequisites to
the external appeal.213 The Pennsylvania DOH will look into any allegation
that enrollees have been disadvantaged in the grievance process. Once at
the external appeal level, state staff facilitates transmittal of the application
to the IRO working with both patients and plans, but DOH does not review
the record before, during, or after transmittal. 1 4
Michigan's OFIS has been authorized by the PRIRA legislation to
establish consumer protection procedures. 215  OFIS provides toll-free
telephone service to explain the external review process, to make sure
consumers know correct complaint procedures, and to refer those ineligible
for IMR to other state or federal agencies.2t 6 For example, health plan
denials for non-payment of premiums are triaged by OFIS but sent to a
separate consumer protection staff handling contractual disputes. OFIS
does not view itself as an advocate for either side in a dispute, but if there is
ambiguity in contract terms or provisions, it is typically interpreted against
the drafter, the health plan. Michigan code provisions mandating specific
benefit coverage are also taken into consideration in reviewing denials and
210. Interviews with Tom Gilevich and Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
211. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162 (2002).
212. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 6.
213. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
214. E-mail from Stacy Mitchell, Dir. of Managed Care, Pa. Dep't of Health, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 15:37:14 CST) (on file with author).
215. Michigan's Health Insurance Independent Review at Two Ycars, available at
http://www.michigan.gov/cis.
216. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
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conduct.217
New York does not have an official ombudsmen unit, but has a large
consumer services bureau in the DOI and a consumer complaint department
in the health department properly known as the Office of Managed Care,
Bureau of Certification and Surveillance. Both of these units actively
respond to consumers and their complaints. New York has an external
appeal hotline for consumers to ask questions and receive assistance with
completing external appeal applications. The Insurance Department's
Health Bureau staffs its hotline with examiners who are assisted by
attorneys as needed. 218 There is also an Office of Consumer Protection
within the Attorney General's Office, which refers complaints on medical
care to the above state agencies.21 9
California's DMHC runs an HMO Help Center that provides around-the-
clock support for consumers by mail and phone. 220 A staff of ten consumer
representatives provides initial screening and advice, supported by a
contractor who provides twenty-four hour call coverage and around-the-
clock back up. Consumer representatives are further supported by a group
of nurses who sort issues of coverage from issues of medical care. The
nursing staff mediates complaints on the spot between health plans and
consumers, and if needed, connects consumers directly to a decision-maker
in a health plan to settle a dispute. Early hospital discharge complaints are
handled immediately in this manner, as are other urgent issues. If
grievances are not settled, representatives assist consumers with the filing
of formal complaints to health plans. California also has a free standing
Office of the Patient Advocate, providing public information and referrals.
4. State Oversight Mechanisms or Special Statutory Provisions
Oversight in all four states is provided through the executive power of
the commissioners or superintendents in the agencies as authorized by law.
In California, a clinical advisory panel consisting of five members
appointed by the Director of the DMHC, meets quarterly in a public forum
to provide expert assistance to ensure that the IMR system is meeting
quality standards sufficient to protect the public's interests.221 The panel
217. Id.
218. E-mail correspondence with Kristin O'Neill, Senior Attorney, Health Bureau, N.Y.
DOI, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 7, 2003, 16:00:06 CST) (on file with author).
219. Id.
220. Description provided in interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16. See also
JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 11-22.
221. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1347.1 (2003). California statute specifies that the
members must consist of professors of medicine from California public and private medical
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reviews redacted IMR decisions to assess whether the decision is consistent
with "best medical practice. 222  The panel recommends approaches to
reducing clinical errors, improving patient safety, increasing the practice of
evidence-based medicine, and promoting and overseeing studies of the IMR
program.223
Furthermore, IMR regulations provide states with authority to take
enforcement action against plans whose action or inaction frustrates or
impedes the IMR system.224 Departments monitor health plan notification
requirements and internal grievance procedures, and administrative
penalties are assessed for patterns of non-compliance or problems in the
health plan review system.225 California has assessed penalties for failure to
provide records to the IRO within required timeframes, failure to provide
proper notice about filing a grievance and access to IMR, and inaccurate
notice as to how to contact the DMHC and IRO. California officials are
aware that some plans fail to provide information as required in denial
letters and health plan certificates of coverage and handbooks. This
problem can be more prevalent in network model health plans or HMOs,
where administrative functions, such as utilization review, authorization
and denial of care, are delegated to physician groups. In these
arrangements, there is a greater probability that corporate health plan
offices will not adequately monitor the results and the processing of first
level determinations, which are sent directly by medical groups to
members.226 Additionally, California, with some of the strongest sanctions,
charges a penalty of $5000 per day when a health plan fails to implement an
IMR decision within five days of its adoption by the Department.227 The
legality of similar state penalties charged to an ERISA health plan was
recently at issue in Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v.
Maryland Insurance Commissioner on the basis that the external review
system was preempted.228 The Maryland Court of Appeals, relying on
schools and two members must be practicing physicians.
222. Interviews, supra note 16.
223. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1347.1.
224. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 550.1929 (2002); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1341.9 (2003) (establishing the powers of the Department of Managed Health Care); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1386 (2003) (establishing the power to assess administrative
penalties); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.86 (2001) (establishing the factors that DMHC's
Director will consider in assessing penalties).
225. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 550.1929.
226. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
227. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 50.
228. Petition dismissed May 6, 2003, U.S., No. 02-1154 (2003) reviewed in Justices
Dismiss Petition in Lawsuit Over Maryland External Review Law, BNA HEALTH L. REP.,
May 15, 2003, at 784.
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Moran, specifically found that state conduct did not improperly enlarge
benefits owed to a beneficiary beyond an ERISA action and that state
administrative remedies and civil penalties were appropriate.229 By denyingcertiorari, the Supreme Court allowed the decision to stand.23°
5. Defining Medical Necessity
Defining medical necessity is at the core of the IMR process, but there is
no generic definition. As background, definitions differ across health plans
and are usually broad.23 1  Health plan definitions, thought to be a
tautology-what the health plan deems medically necessary is so-are
likely in practice to be narrow, self-serving, and, accordingly, suspect.232
Like legal determinations, medical necessity determinations can only be
defined in relationship to a specific case and a specific set of facts. Under
the fee-for-service model, medical necessity corresponded to the individual
decision of the treating physician. This approach obviously conflicts with
"managing care" and the potential benefits to be derived from systems of
care that have the capacity to benchmark and compare treatment decisions
in real-time against evidence-based clinical standards and care guidelines.
However, financial incentives facing health plans can distort judgments
about what is medically necessary.
Consequently, IMR reviewers in a majority of jurisdictions have been
allowed by statute to review cases de novo and without the deference
accorded health plan definitions more commonly found in the judicial
forum.233 Of the four states, only Pennsylvania law binds its reviewers to
health plan definitions of medical necessity.23 4 Michigan reports that health
plans often try to define medical necessity, but the guideposts used are too
general and "very subjective., 235
The four states studied also do not define medical necessity directly.
New York statute establishes that health care plans are expected to act
229. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r for Md., 810 A.2d 425,425 (2002).
230. Id.
231. Broad definitions are a double-edged sword. Breadth is necessary because it is
difficult to determine, at the health plan level, a definition of medical necessity that would
work across a wide variety of patients and presenting health conditions; on the other hand,
breadth provides a health plan and its Medical Director with a great deal of discretion. See
Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of
Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 193 (2002). Therefore, both states and
plans use standards of review to operationalize this definition.
232. Id.
233. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
234. 40 PA. CONS. STAT § 991.2162(c)(5) (2002).
235. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
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reasonably and appropriately in the best interest of the patient using sound
medical judgment.236 New York law further provides that IMR reviewers
can consider clinical standards as presented by the health plan and can
uphold them as appropriate, but are not bound by them.237 California
statute only stipulates the criteria that reviewers must apply in adjudicating
a medical necessity claim. 238 According to the statute, necessity is based on
the specific needs of an enrollee and five criteria: 1) peer-reviewed
scientific and medical evidence regarding the effectiveness of the disputed
service; 2) nationally recognized professional standards; 3) expert opinion;
4) generally accepted standards of medical practice; and 5) treatments that
are likely to provide a benefit to a patient for conditions for which other
239treatments are not clinically efficacious.
Pennsylvania staff note that external appeals are not about disputes over
medical necessity, but over what is deemed medically appropriate. 240 Most
disputes do not typically revolve around "need., 241 For example, there is no
dispute that a patient needs treatment for prostate cancer; rather, the dispute
centers around what protocol to use and where to go for care, for example,
in or out-of-network. From Michigan's staff perspective, disputes raise
both need and appropriateness issues and each dispute is patient specific.242
Additionally, issues of medical necessity inevitably overlap with issues
of coverage. Most plans strive to have clear certificates of coverage and
airtight exclusions, which clarify what they will not cover regardless of
medical need.243 For example, plans will not cover participation in Phase
One or Phase Two drug studies, cosmetic surgery, or custodial care. 2"
However, patients dispute these coverage exclusions when they need care.
Therefore, agency staff often review health plan contracts or certificates of
coverage to determine whether an exclusion was in effect at the time of the
denial; whether contract language is misleading or whether care can be
received in or out-of-network for certain conditions, procedures or specialty
236. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914 (2003).
237. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b)(4).
238. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33 (2003).
239. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.33.
240. This may not be an important distinction because one cannot always distinguish the
concepts of necessity and appropriateness in practice. However, Pennsylvania's statute
includes appropriateness in defining what constitutes a grievance, and this allows more types
of cases to go to IMR. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16. See also e-mail
correspondence with Stacy Mitchell, Dir. of Managed Care, Pa. Dep't of Health, to Leatrice
Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 15:37:14 CST) (on file with author).
241. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
242. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
243. Interviews, supra note 16.
244. Id.
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services; and whether the plan has failed in any of its administrative
obligations relative to handling the claim.
245
Furthermore, compliance and contractual reviews precede, and
determine, the results of many appeals, which appear to focus on medical
necessity. Benefits and exclusions must match state coverage mandates, so
specific services, such as prosthesis and reconstructive surgery after a
mastectomy, or nutritional supplementation after a phenylketonuria
(PKU) 246 finding in an infant, become specifically relevant on the basis of
both need and state coverage mandates. 247 Also, because employers can
carve out certain areas of coverage in customized benefit plans, staff
analysts must understand employer prerogatives in relationship to ERISA,
compliance with insurance law, and state exemptions.248
As a result of the overlap between coverage and medical need, Michigan
analysts, who cover a wider range of disputes because they review all
denials, must give deference to the certificate of insurance, which has the
effect of a binding contract. The certificate will often control the analysis
as to whether a dispute is really about coverage or care.249 At the same
time, the certificate is used as a guide for all disputes only if reasonable
under common law and consistent with state statute. Moreover, if a
coverage issue involves an assessment of medical necessity, or raises
ambiguities as to whether coverage or care is involved, it will be sent to the
IRO.25' If medical standards have changed or the definition of medical
necessity in an insurance contract is too narrow, not workable, or obsolete,
the IRO has freedom to deviate.252 Likewise, if a plan defines E/I treatment
in a narrow or restrictive way that appears unreasonable, the IRO's
judgment will trump the plan's coverage definitions.253
Even in Pennsylvania, which is bound by the health plan definition, the
IRO reviewer has the freedom to function in a similar way.254 While being
bound might create a presumption in the health plan's favor, Pennsylvania
uphold and reversal/overturn rates are not much different than states where
245. Id.
246. A screening test routinely administered to newborns to measure amino acids to
identify/prevent mental retardation.
247. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16. Other interviewees expressed similar
situations in their respective states. See also Interviews, supra note 16.
248. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
249. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
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there is no deference to health plan definitions.255
In sum, definitions of medical necessity do not provide applicable
standards. Legislatures have made health plan definitions non-binding.256
Even when given deference, these definitions are meaningful only if
reasonable in relationship to a specific case and consistent with state law
and professional standards. Health plan definitions and discretion, while
controlling in a courtroom setting, are empty vessels once an appeal gets to
the level of an IMR, where the clinical standard has replaced the legal
standard.257 Last, medical necessity continues to be intermingled with
coverage and contractual obligations, which are given greater deference in
the pre-IMR review process. In this respect, the greater battlefield in
settling disputes over care is in the area of contracts, certificates of
coverage, and benefits. Control over what is or is not covered in the
standard benefit package, and patient expectations as to what is entailed in a
comprehensive health plan, may be the more significant area for patient
advocates in the next phase of IMR. 8 Insurers will strive to draft clearer
contracts with airtight exclusions, while states will continue to pass
condition and procedure-specific legislation in response to public
expectations regarding what constitutes essential health services.
6. Impact on Health Plans
Respondents report that IMR has impacted the managed care industry in
several specific ways. 9 On the positive side, for example:
. External review gives health plans credibility.
260
255. KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 4.
256. Interviews, supra note 16. See also KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 18
(showing the wide discretion given to the external review agent in determining whether care
is medically necessary or appropriate).
257. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2, at 229-30.
258. Clark C. Havighurst, Consumers Versus Managed Care: The New Class Actions.
20 HEALTH AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2001, at 8, 19-20; John D. Blum, Overcoming Managed
Care Regulatory Chaos Through a Restructured Federalism, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 327, 327
(2001). See also Studdert & Gresenz, supra note 15, at 868-69.
259. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 29. Five of seven health plans surveyed for a
California report responded that they were positively impacted by the plan. However, one of
the plans reported that the IMR system challenged its credibility with subscribers and two
plans felt that IMR has had little impact. Id.
260. Interviews, supra note 16. See also Aaron Seth Kesselheim, Comment, Wat's the
Appeal? Trying to Control Managed Care Medical Necessity Decision-Making Through a
System of External Appeals, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 911 n.75 (2001) (referencing Rhonda
L. Rundle, External Review of HMO Decisions Becomes Hot Issue, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
1998, at B2).
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* The caliber of documentation and the evidence base behind
treatment decisions in health plans seems to have improved.261
* IMR decisions provide an incremental and stable feedback loop
for plans. Too many reversals indicate problems. While not
having precedental value, IMR determinations change health
plan clinical policy over time.262 Specifically, this is evidenced
263in the area of emerging technologies and drug regimens. In
California, where six separate reviewers reversed 100% of health
plan denials involving bariatric surgery (gastric bypass surgery),
citing National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines, health
plans changed their approval guidelines for the procedure.26
* Given demonstrated and potential effects on health plan practices
in Michigan, state personnel liken the cumulative impact of the
IMR remedy to an ongoing class action,2 65 because it puts
ongoing, consistent pressure on the industry on behalf of patients
as if they are acting collectively.
* As a byproduct of IMR, state agencies are identifying the need
for clearer state regulations on permissible contract exclusions
and exemptions. Specifically, custodial care and cosmetic
surgery in New York fall into this category and have demanded
attention from the state.266 These examples suggest that the IMR
261. Interviews, supra note 16.
262. Louise G. Trubek, Informing, Claiming, Contracting: Enforcement in the Managed
Care Era, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 133, 140 (1999).
263. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 28.
264. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
265. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
266. Health plans in New York have questioned the applicability of the external appeal
process to determinations that surgical services are cosmetic or that care is custodial because
of Insurance Department Regulation 62, promulgated years prior to the External Appeal
Law. N.Y. 2001 REPORT, supra note 63, at 17. This regulation permits plans to exclude
these areas from coverage. New York, in light of the IMR process, however, considers these
services to raise medical necessity issues. Id. As well, custodial care which involves help in
transferring, eating, dressing, bathing, toileting and other such related activities (all
considered activities of daily living that would not be covered) often is appropriatelyintermingled with rehabilitation or private care/skilled nursing care. Id. Specifically, New
York has made the following statement:
New York State Insurance Law and corresponding regulations require most plans
to provide coverage for surgical services. Regulation 62 does permit plans to
exclude coverage for cosmetic surgery but provides an automatic exception to the
cosmetic surgery exclusion for reconstructive surgery. Reconstructive surgery is
one exception to the cosmetic surgery exclusion but is not the only type of
surgery that is considered medically necessary. If the reconstructive surgery
exception is not met, the plans must still consider whether the surgery is
medically necessary or cosmetic. It is the Insurance Department's position that
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process serves a normative function and keys the health plan
system to evolving professional care standards.
* Health plans have demonstrated a high level of compliance with
IMR procedures and decisions. Very few cases have proceeded
to court.
267
* There has been a remarkable democratization in the availability
of information, accessible on the Internet, about health plan
grievances, health plan track records, and external appeal
experiences. New York and California produce extensive annual
reports on the IMR experience, HMO Complaint and Grievance
Reports, and consumer information about health plans.268 Web
postings include information about complaints and calls, as well
as the number of internal and external complaints and grievances
by specific plan name. States calculate ratios of complaints per
member and rank health plans accordingly. California also
reports reversal and uphold rates by general categories of cases
or by procedures and conditions. 269 Furthermore, Michigan and
California post all of their IMR review decisions on department
web sites with patient names redacted.27° California provides
information that identifies the nature of the issue raised in the
review and the result.271 Michigan lists all decisions by name of
the health plan with a brief description of not only the issue and
decision, but also the rationale for the decision by each case.272
A consumer in Michigan interested in mounting an appeal can
view all previous decisions about that condition both across
plans as well as by specific plan.273 As a result, consumers are
whenever surgery itself is a covered benefit under a policy, a determination that
the surgery is cosmetic is a 'medical necessity' determination subject to both
utilization review and external review requirements.
Id.
267. New York and California report only a few known court actions. In one California
case, an IMR decision overturned a health plan denial, but the insurer went to court and won.
Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
268. Reports, supra note 105.
269. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 28.
270. CAL. DEP'T OF MANAGED CARE, INDEPENDENT MEDICAL REVIEW DATABASE, at
http://wp.dmhc.ca.gov/imr/display.asp; MICH. CONSUMER & INDUST. SERVS., PRIRA CASES,
at http://www.michigan.gov/cis/0, 1607,7-154-10555_20594_20596-,00.html.
271. CAL. DEP'T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, INDEPENDENT MEDICAL REVIEW
DATABASE, at http://wp.dmhc.ca.gov/imr/display.asp.
272. MICH. CONSUMER & INDUST. SERVS., PRIRA CASES, at http://www.michigan.gov/
cis/0, 1607,7-154-1055520594_20596-,00.html.
273. Id.
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able to make more informed and reasonable decisions about
whether to pursue a specific appeal.
Despite the positive effects of IMR, there have been some negative
ramifications. For example:
* States report that early resistance from the managed care
industry to IMR regulation has merely yielded acceptance of its
political necessity, rather than proactive acceptance or
endorsement.
274
" Many plans have tightened contractual exclusions to make it
quite clear what they will and will not cover.275 (However, plans
can only "reasonably restrict" coverage given competitive
market forces and state mandates.276 In addition, if health plans
move to unduly restrict benefits, state legislators across the
country are poised to respond with new condition and procedure-
specific benefit expansions. 277)
* In the strongest reaction to the overall adjudicatory scheme, Blue
Cross-Blue Shield in Michigan has mounted a constitutional
challenge to the IMR process on the basis that it violates due
process and the rules of evidence, i.e., it neither allows testimony
nor cross-examination of the IRO reviewer.278
7. Judicial Action or Suit and the IMR Link
As early conflict resolution is clearly in the best interest of consumers
and less expensive than filing lawsuits, IMR is believed to provide benefits
to consumers and plans. All respondents reinforced the notion that external
appeals reduce the perception of bias, provide an outlet for consumers and,
thus, reduce litigation for plans. 279 Even though all jurisdictions surveyed
provide access to the judicial forum after IMR, external appeal, in effect,
insulates the managed care industry from lawsuits.
Nevertheless, some states place restrictions on access to the judicial
forum. California and Pennsylvania passed legislation requiring that the
IMR process must be exhausted before a plaintiff can proceed to court. Of
the four states sampled, only Pennsylvania creates a presumption against a
274. Interviews, supra note 16.
275. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
276. Id.
277. Interviews, supra note 16.
278. Id.
279. See also Agrawal & Hall, supra note 46, at 278.
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plaintiff if the IMR process upholds a health plan denial.280 In comparison,
New York and Michigan allow concurrent jurisdiction and access to the
courts. Even though Michigan allows concurrent IMR and court2811jurisdiction, some judges hold cases pending the results of the IMR.
Despite the variance across states, an IMR decision would be admissible as
evidence in a court proceeding in any state.
Notwithstanding the patient's right to appeal a case in state court,
Pennsylvania staff can recall only one lawsuit filing after an IMR denial
was upheld. Likewise, one lawsuit is currently pending in New York, and
several have been filed in Michigan. Generally, plaintiffs bring both tort
and breach of contract actions; overall, however, few people have
proceeded to court.
Of the four states sampled, California stands out for creating a new
private right of action 282 against a health care service plan or managed care
entity for a breach of the duty of ordinary care to provide medically
necessary health care services under California Civil Code § 3428.283 As a
prerequisite for this claim, a health care service must be a covered benefit
provided by the plan. To find a health plan liable, a failure to exercise
ordinary care must result from a denial, delay, or modification of a health
care service recommended for, or furnished to, a subscriber or enrollee.284
Furthermore, the subscriber or enrollee must suffer substantial harm.
Substantial harm means loss of life, loss or significant impairment of limb
or bodily function, significant disfigurement, severe and chronic physical
pain, or significant financial loss. 285 A health plan can be held liable for
health care services recommended or furnished by an out-of-plan provider,
but the provider must be practicing within the scope of his or her practice
and the health care service must be recommended or furnished prior to the
inception of the action, although the recommendation need not be made
prior to the occurrence of harm.286 This new cause of action is directed
solely against health plans and managed care entities; its provisions
explicitly protect health care providers or employers and plans cannot seek
280. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 991.2162(c)(5) (2002).
281. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
282. See KAISER ASSESSMENT, supra note 7, at 28 (showing that nine states across the
country have created a new cause of action related to health plan or managed care entity
liability).
283. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428 (2003). See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3428(a)-(k)
(2003).
284. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(a)(1), (2).
285. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(b).
286. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(b).
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indemnity from health care providers.287 Additionally, subscribers cannot
contractually waive this right.
Although IMR is not a categorical prerequisite for this cause of action,
plaintiffs must establish that they have "exhausted the procedures provided
by the applicable independent review system. ' '288  An exception is made
only in cases where substantial harm has occurred or will imminently occur
prior to the completion of the review. 289 As a result, if an enrollee does not
apply for an IMR and attempts to obtain damages from the health plan for
negligence, the cause of action may be dismissed.29 ° Counsel at the DMHC
is not aware of any claims based on this new cause of action, 291 as
mandatory arbitration provisions and ERISA have significantly limited the
number of actions brought against California health plans.292
D. Summary
The consensus opinion among staff from the four state sample is that
TMR works and aids both consumers, providers, and the states. 293 Enrollees
seem to find IMR fair and impartial, and state agencies feel the reviews
impart important information to patients about treatment options.9
Despite this, recent reports from California indicate that consumers and
their providers may want more disclosure and greater detail about final
determinations and rationales.295 Consumers appear to need more guidance
and support in negotiating the process, 296 and physicians and state personnel
report that physicians are not sufficiently involved.297 In conclusion, state
respondents reported interest in making very specific operational
refinements in IMR. However, none of these reflect a shift in policy with
respect to the underlying remedial scheme. For example:
0 Pennsylvania has considered ways to alleviate tight time frames
287. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(d)-(f).
288. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(k)(1).
289. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(k)(2)(A), (B).
290. JOHN Q. REPORT, supra note 78, at 51.
291. E-mail correspondence with Tom Gilevich, Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Managed Health
Care, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 18:23:15 CST) (on file with author).
292. Interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
293. Interviews, supra note 16.
294. Interview with Stacy Mitchell, supra note 16.
295. IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66, at 3.
296. See supra Part -III.C.2.a-d (focusing on limitations in eligibility, patient "know-
how" with respect to their right to a review, how to exercise that right and how to negotiate
the administrative hurdles).
297. See supra Part III.C.3.b.
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for patients filing appeals who require more time to gather
documentation. Because time frames are based in statute and
cannot be waived, the state works with health plans to be flexible
in these situations. Although the DOH has considered legislative
amendment, it believes it can administer the system without
legislative change. Michigan staff also would like to loosen time
frames and provide greater leeway for the state and parties to
waive the transaction time limits for mounting an appeal from
beginning to end. This would require legislative change. The
state would also like to increase caseload to have greater
impact.
298
An anomaly in the California legislation excluded some PPO
enrollees insured by plans licensed through Knox-Keene and
under the jurisdiction of the DMHC, unlike those insured under
products regulated by the California DOI. 29 9  These enrollees
were not eligible for review after they received treatment, even
though they may not have had an opportunity to obtain
authorization or denial before in-network services were
rendered.300  This problem was recently corrected through
legislative change. 30' Additionally, California staff would like to
address concerns raised in the IMR reports, such as using the
IMR database to foster policy debate about care delivery and
coverage as well as improving the appeal process and
relationships among the parties in the appeal process.30 2
Presently, DMHC is focusing on promulgation of access
standards for managed care, including standards for provider
network configurations. Therefore, refinements in IMR, which
require legislative action, are not imminent.
In sum, states may be tinkering at the margins of the IMR system, but
they are overwhelmingly satisfied with the current nature of the dispute
resolution process. Furthermore, states are developing increasingly
sophisticated infrastructures to handle complaints and triage external,
independent reviews.
298. Interview with Paul Duguay, supra note 16.
299. See supra Part III.C.1, 2.a-b.
300. Id.; e-mail correspondence with Tom Gilevich, Counsel, Dep't of Managed Health
Care, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 18:23:15 CST).
301. E-mail correspondence with Tom Gilevich, Counsel, Dep't of Managed Health
Care, to Leatrice Berman-Sandler (Oct. 2, 2003, 18:23:15 CST).
302. IMR REPORT 2002, supra note 65, at 1, 20-24; IMR REPORT 2003, supra note 66,
at 2-6, 39-42; interview with Tom Gilevich, supra note 16.
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IV. ERISA PREEMPTION EXPLORED
Despite the viability of the IMR remedy and its strengthened foothold
post-Moran, it is not available to a majority of those beneficiaries covered
by employer-sponsored health plans because of ERISA preemption.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been steadily supporting expanded
state regulation of ERISA health plans and has recently opened some new
doors.
Given the desire to create a national uniform system for regulating multi-
state employer welfare and pension funds, ERISA preempts state laws that
"relate to" ERISA benefit plans.3 °3 However, certain state laws, including
those that regulate insurance, banking, and securities, are carved out and
saved from preemption by the ERISA "savings clause" because such laws
remain in the traditional and political terrain of state governments and state
regulators. 304  ERISA issues are further complicated by the "deemer
clause," which creates exceptions to the savings clause. The deemer clause
prohibits states from directly regulating employer plans as if they were
insurance entities. 30 5 However, employers often use insurance carriers and
other third party administrators in various ways to support benefits
administration. In the health arena, this takes various forms such as
assuming or sharing financial risk, administering the plan, and/or
coordinating benefit services; this further complicates ERISA preemption
analysis and forces one to determine whether insurance regulation attaches
to a specific employer benefit arrangement.30 6 As a result of attempts to fit
legitimate state health plan regulation into the ERISA puzzle created by
relationships between the "relate to," "savings" and "deemer clauses," the
Supreme Court has codified a common law distinction between self-funded
insured plans, which can be reached by insurance regulation, and self-
funded non-insured plans, which are protected by ERISA preemption.30 7
303. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). See also N. Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 645 (1995) ("relating to" an ERISA plan is
its own complicated analysis of whether a law actually is directed at the plan and would
destroy uniform and integrated federal law guiding the plan or is something akin to a law of
general applicability [like a state tax on providers or health plans] which would only
indirectly affect the employer plan).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A) (hereinafter the "savings clause").
305. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (hereinafter the "deemer clause"). See supra text
accompanying notes 343-347 (discussing McCarran-Ferguson factors which the Court uses
to determine whether a law is in fact a bona-fide insurance regulation).
306. See generally Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ER1SA: Will the
Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 952-58, 996
(2000) (suggesting the return of substantive state regulation of nonpension employee
benefits).
307. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that
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It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran.3 °8 In Moran, Deborah Moran sued her
HMO for not adhering to the decision of an [MR and for denying
reimbursement for an expensive surgical procedure. 30 9 Despite the IMR
determination in Ms. Moran's favor, the HMO viewed the procedure as
medically unnecessary and believed it was under no obligation to follow the
Illinois mandate. The case specifically raised the question of whether state
mandated IMR, a provision of Illinois' Health Maintenance Organization
Act,3 0 applied to a "self-funded-insured" ERISA plan or, conversely, was
preempted because it related to the employer health benefit plan. The Court
held that, by virtue of the ERISA savings clause, Illinois' IMR law was
considered to be insurance regulation.31'
ERISA preemption analysis required, first, that the Court identify
whether Rush-Prudential was an employer benefit plan or an insurer subject
to the law, and second, whether the law in question was insurance
regulation eligible to be "saved." Although Rush-Prudential never clarified
its contractual or risk-relationship to the employer, the Court presumed it
was acting as insurer, provider, and plan administrator on behalf of the
employer.312 The Court made it clear that Rush's exact status was
immaterial because it was clearly an HMO, and the Illinois law was
directed at HMOs which by definition are risk-bearing insurance vehicles
subject to state regulation. 31 3  Rush-Prudential then argued that it was a
provider and HMO regulation was not principally insurance regulation.314
The Court rejected this argument, stating that it did not have to choose
among these characterizations, noting that an entity did not have to be
a state-mandated mental health benefit related to an ERISA plan but was saved and therefore
applicable to insurers of ERISA benefits). See also Bogan, supra note 306, at 996 nn.217-
18. See supra Part IV and text accompanying notes 340-347.
308. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
309. Id.
310. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 125/4-10 (2003).
311. Moran, 536 U.S. at 387 (affirming a Seventh Circuit ruling and stating that
"regulating insurance tied to what is medically necessary is probably inseparable from
enforcing ... state-law standards of reasonable medical care .... The saving[s] clause is
entitled to prevail here").
312. Id. at 363 (inferring that Rush was the plan administrator because the plan's
sponsor granted it discretion to interpret the terms of coverage).
313. Id. at 367 (stating that Rush received a fee from the employer for each recipient and
as such was under a risk-bearing contract of some nature to render health services to
employees and their families). See also Pegram v. Herdrich, 30 US 211, 218 (2000); Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) (reiterating that
underwriting and spreading risk are distinctive features of insurance).
314. Moran, 536 U.S. at 366-67.
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solely an insurer to be subject to insurance regulation.315
Using the common sense test and the McCarran-Ferguson factors as
guideposts,31 6 the Court confirmed that the IMR provision was insurance
regulation because it met two of the three McCarran-Ferguson factors.317
First, by construing the medical standards under the policy as to what is
medically necessary, the IMR interpreted policy terms and regulated an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and insured, thus
satisfying one of the McCarran-Ferguson factors.318 The IMR translated
"the relationship under the HMO agreement into concrete terms of specific
obligation or freedom from duty" and "the interpretation of insurance
contracts is at the core of the "business of insurance."31 9 Second, the IMR
law regulated a practice limited to entities within the insurance industry,
satisfying a second McCarran-Ferguson factor. 320 Because the Illinois IMR
law satisfied two factors, it came under the protection of the ERISA savings
clause.321
Most significantly, the Court clarified that the characterization of an
HMO as insurer remains even when it acts in a non-insuring capacity, for
example, when providing only administrative services. 322 Rush-Prudential
tried to persuade the Court that the Illinois' law swept too broadly because
it would capture organizations that provide no insurance and bear no risk
because they have transferred risk to providers or reinsurers or because they
only provide administrative services for self-funded plans.3 23  The Court
rejected these arguments holding that passing risk downstream to providers
or upstream to reinsurers does not take the primary insurer out of the
insurance business.324
In sum, the Court held that Rush-Prudential HMO was an insurance
315. Id.
316. Id. McCarran-Ferguson Act, an antitrust law, had an exemption for the "business
of insurance," recognizing that state governments would force some concerted action on the
part of insurance companies in the context of local insurance regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 1011
(2000). To the extent they were regulated by federal law, therefore, insurance companies
were immune from federal antitrust scrutiny. The Court had developed factors that define
the "business of insurance" in cases which interpreted McCarran-Ferguson, and the Court
borrowed these and applied them to ERISA preemption cases. Moran, 536 U.S. at 366-67.
317. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 125/4-10 (2003).
318. Moran, 536 U.S. at 373.
319. Id. at 373-74.
320. Id. at 374.
321. Id. at 373.
322. Id. at371.
323. ld. at 370-71.
324. Moran, 536 U.S. at 371. Illinois law also defines HMOs to include contractors
who might only provide administrative services or arrange health care services for a self-
funded plan. Therefore, even "matchmaker" HMOs are insurance entities. Id. at 372.
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entity performing insurance functions subject to state insurance regulation,
and that the IMR provision was state insurance regulation and, thus not
preempted by ERISA.32 5 Furthermore, Moran implies that IMR mandates
apply broadly to ERISA plans using insurance entities, irrespective of
exactly what services those entities might be performing. This is true even
if the health plan is attempting to hide behind the guise of being the plan
administrator with delegated fiduciary responsibilities and even if the law
indirectly affects the ERISA plan. 26  While the Moran decision is
significant, it has been interpreted to be limited to self-funded insured plans
and not all ERISA plans.327
Ten months after the Moran decision, the Court reconsidered insurance
regulation of ERISA plans in Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v.
Miller. The Court held that any willing provider ("AWP") laws are
insurance regulation, which saves them from preemption.328 Although the
facts of Miller and Moran are different, they are critical to understanding
how the Court views insurance regulation and ERISA preemption in the
health plan context.3 29  The Court reiterated the breadth of the savings
clause by noting that Congress did not limit insurance regulation to only
"insurance companies" or "the business of insurance.,, 330 A law need only
be a "law... which regulates insurance" to be saved from ERISA
preemption.331 The Court re-emphasized that state insurance regulation has
an impact on HMOs even if they are not in a risk or insurance relationship
with an employer because merely administering self-funded employer plans
325. Id. at 365.
326. Id.
327. Ketterman, supra note 121, at 92.
328. Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1475 (2003).
"Any willing provider" laws mandate that any provider willing to meet the requirements of
participation in a managed care plan has a right to be on a plan's provider panel and cannot
be lawfully denied participation. This conflicts with the practice of managed care plans
limiting their provider panels to control both costs and quality of care by using smaller
panels and exacting deeper discounts between provider and plan. PAT BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD.
FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, KENTUCKY'S "ANY WILLING PROVIDER" LAW AND ERISA:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION FOR STATE HEALTH INSURANCE
REGULATION 2 (JUNE 2003), available at www.nashp.org.
329. Much of the logic in parsing out the potential meaning of Miller in combination
with Moran is a result of personal interview with Mark Rust, Managing Partner and
Attorney, Barnes & Thornburg's Chicago Office (April 25, 2003) and presentation by Mr.
Rust at the Chicago Bar Association Health Law Committee, May 5, 2003 (hereinafter
"Interview with Mark Rust"). Mr. Rust argued the Moran case in front of the Supreme
Court and submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the American Medical Association in
Miller. Mr. Rust is not responsible for any errors of interpretation of either Moran or Miller.
330. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1476 n.1.
331. Miller, 123 S. Ct. at 1475, 1477 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1974)).
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suffices to bring HMOs within the activity of insurance for purposes of the
savings clause.332 Furthermore, the Miller decision altered the McCarran-
Ferguson factors, transforming the three-factor test into a two-factor
inquiry. Accordingly, a law must be specifically directed toward entities
engaged in the provision of insurance and must affect the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured to be deemed insurance
regulation.333
Thus, Moran and Miller opine that employer plans administered under
HMO or insurance contracts can be regulated by state insurance law
whether they are risk-bearing or not. Miller suggests that any willing
provider laws might be enforceable against HMOs that provide mere access
to a provider network for self-insured employers. Additionally, insurance
regulation might reach not only an entity that is insuring in the traditional
sense of absorbing financial risk, but one that is also merely administering
the self-insured plan and providing other insurance-like functions.334 In
both cases, the Court went out of its way to reinforce that self-funded-
insured as well as non-insured ERISA plans employ the same kinds of
insurance practices that would subject both to state insurance regulations,
but for the deemer clause.
As a result of the Miller decision, the legal community has been quick to
point out335 that "the ruling continues another trend, one that has set up a
divide between what states can do with respect to insured plans.., and
self-insured plans ... [which remain] unaffected by the AWP decisions. 336
Nonetheless, these cases put the spotlight on insurance practices of all
entities working with self-funded plans, suggesting a broader application of
state insurance regulation which further permeates the ERISA barrier.
Thus, some doors may have opened as a result of these opinions and others
as noted below.
332. Id. at 1476. The Court further acknowledged that self-funded (non-insured) ERISA
plans would be subject to such laws, but for the deemer clause (and that Congress clearly
recognized this and wrote the deemer clause to save them from direct state regulation),
because, by inference, they engage in the same sort of risk pooling arrangements as
insurance entities in administering employee benefit plans. Id.
333. Id. at 1479.
334. Id. at 1475. See also U.S. Supreme Court: Impact of Any Willing Provider
Decision Could Be seen in Contracting, Choices, 9 HEALTH PLAN & PROVIDER REP. 15, 379
(2003).
335. Ketterman, supra note 121, at 92 (showing how the Moran decision does not apply
to the fifty-six million people whose companies are self-insured, and thus not subject to state
external review laws).
336. Brian Broderick & Peyton M. Sturges, Health Care Professionals Debate Impact of
High Court 'Any Willing Provider' Ruling, 12 HEALTH L. REP. 15, 559 (2003) (quoting
Anthony F. Sheeley, Attorney with Miller & Chevalier in Washington, D.C.).
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Door #1: State insurance regulation could be expanded to encompass any
organized entity acting on behalf of an employer (or activity on behalf of an
employer) performing either traditional insurance risk pooling or merely
administrative functions related to the authorization of
benefits and the provision of health care services.
In rejecting Rush's arguments that IMR laws should not apply to HMO
"matchmaker" entities which simply link a self-funded plan to a provider
network, the Moran Court inferred that the Illinois IMR provision would
apply to any entity directed by the law to provide covered medically
necessary services and administer insurance functions, whether it shares
risk or not. The Court in Moran appears to comfortably tolerate some
overbreadth in the application of the IMR provision to non-orthodox
insurance arrangements or insurance "actors".337 Guided by this ruling and
the two remaining McCarran Ferguson factors, states can see what types of
law constitute appropriate insurance regulation-first, any state law that is
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance practices as
defined broadly in Moran and Kentucky v. Miller; and second, any state law
that substantially affects the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer
and the insured. These factors could encompass any state initiative relating
to benefits and any number of regulatory initiatives to place requirements
on health plan practices to protect the welfare of state residents. Therefore,
newly crafted and broadened insurance regulation might attach to any
number of entities providing traditional insurance practices or authorizing
care.
338
Door #2: The broad interpretation of ERISA's deemer clause remains an
obstacle for the Court and Congress. However, the Court might be moving
toward confronting this barrier to allow states increasingly to attach
insurance regulation to all employer-sponsored health plans.
The deemer clause has become a major source of discrimination against
beneficiaries in self-funded non-insured plans, fostering, for example,
employer practices with reinsurers just to take advantage of ERISA
preemption.339  As inferred by recent opinions, the Court appears to
337. Moran, 536 U.S. at 372.
338. Although the deemer clause would still save most self-funded plans from state
regulation if they directly administer insurance functions, states could be more aggressive in
clearly delineating activity conducted by third parties which constitutes insurance practice.
Exceptions to the savings clause could, perhaps, be narrowed, making it more difficult for
employer-based plans to circumvent appropriate state insurance regulation, the outcome of
which is discrimination against an entire class of health insurance beneficiaries.
339. Amer. Med. Security, Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Circ. 1997) (holding that
states could not fix the minimum attachment point for stop-loss insurance which allows
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recognize the need to reach all employer plans that provide essentially
similar health insurance and care authorization functions. The Court may
be inching closer to Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in FMC v. Holliday,
where he argued that there is no rational reason for treating self-funded-
non-insured plans differently from insured plans, and from the point of
view of beneficiaries, these distinctions are unfair.340 Yet, the Court and
Congress have regrettably maintained ERISA preemption for self-funded-
non-insured plans.
While Moran and Miller do not directly challenge this, the current Court
seems impatient with appellee arguments requiring maintaining the fine-
line distinctions among benefits administration, risk spreading, other
insurance functions, and provisions of medical care when plaintiffs seek
equitable state-based IMR remedies consistent with ERISA's intended civil
enforcement scheme. 341 Although both of these cases confronted ERISA
preemption for self-funded-insured plans, more recent sentiments from the
Court echo Justice Stevens' concerns about uniform application of legal
principles. Justice Stevens commented that "disparate treatment of
similarly situated beneficiaries ... somehow supported by an interest in
[ERISA] uniformity is singularly unpersuasive. '342
On the other hand, the deemer clause remains a serious obstacle in
bridging the gap to a full application of the IMR remedy. The Court in
FMC v. Holliday specifically rejected a narrow interpretation of the deemer
clause that promoted making only those state insurance regulations that are
pretexts for impinging upon core ERISA concerns exceptions to the savings
clause.343 In rejecting this proposition, the Court recognized that it was
reinforcing ERISA's already over-expansive reach and solidifying the
unnatural dichotomy between self-funded insured and non-insured health
plans.344
This dichotomy between ERISA insured plans and self-funded plans was
employee benefit plans to more easily self-insure and which is used as a mechanism to avoid
state health insurance and benefits regulation).
340. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65-72 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). FMC
involved ERISA preemption of a Pennsylvania law providing that there shall be no right of
subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefits payable under any
program, group contract, or other arrangements for payment in a motor vehicle
accident/action. The Court held that ERISA preempted a self-funded plan, despite the
savings clause, because a self-funded employer plan cannot be deemed an insurance
company; this would not be true of an employer using an insurance-arrangement. Id. at 66-
72.
341. Interview with Mark Rust, supra note 329.
342. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 63.
344. Id. at 63-64.
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first articulated in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Massachusetts
when the Court legitimized the distinction, set forth by the Massachusetts
Attorney General, allowing state insurance law to directly regulate ERISA-
insured plans but not ERISA self-funded plans. 345 The Court acknowledged
that enforcing the deemer clause in this manner "results in a distinction
between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect
regulation while the latter are not. '346 The Court further noted that "by so
doing, we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the
'deemer clause,' a distinction Congress is aware of and one it has chosen
not to alter.,
347
Will this distinction last in the long run? Furthermore, will currently
insured ERISA health plans increasingly defect to self-funded-non-insured
status given the requirements of managing health benefits and primary
insurance risk?348 These issues are not settled and it is not yet clear how
expansive the Court will be in applying insurance regulation to a variety of
third party or reinsurance arrangements in the future. With the Court's
emphasis on reducing false distinctions, the moment may be ripe for
crafting new theories to challenge these distinctions.
Door #3: IMR remedies, although viewed primarily as insurance
regulation, could be saved from preemption under grounds related to
traditional state authority over medical care quality and treatment,
irrespective of the insurance arrangement of an ERISA plan.
A line of cases that has penetrated the ERISA shield by focusing on state
regulation of medical care, also opens the door for further IMR support. In
Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court discussed the type and range of
employer health benefit decisions and how they are treated under ERISA.349
The Court made a critical distinction between pure benefits administration
(or fiduciary decisions), medical treatment decisions, and mixed (benefits
and treatment) decisions. 350 The Court suggested that legal claims that fall
outside of being fiduciary decisions should not be subject to preemption.
Specifically, the court stated that when health plan benefit decisions are
sufficiently mixed, "[s]tate law should govern in any case in which medical
345. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding
that a state-mandated mental health benefit related to an ERISA plan but was saved in
application to the insurers of ERISA benefits). See also Bogan, supra note 306, at 996
nn.217-18.
346. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 62. See supra Part IV and text accompanying notes 340-347.
347. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 62.
348. Bogan, supra note 306, at 1004-06.
349. See generally Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
350. Id. at 228-37.
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injury is alleged to have flowed from flawed medical judgment, regardless
of the context in which that judgment is exercised. 35 1  This thwarts
preemption of state laws that regulate medical care and state claims that
allege health plan malpractice by implicating plan administrators or their
agents in medical outcome-determinative decisions. An overlapping
framework, articulated in Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, distinguished claims
that address the administration, or "quantum" of benefits, from those that
challenge the "quality" of benefits and, more specifically, the medical
treatment performed under those benefits.352
Using either the quantity or quality dichotomy of Dukes or the
administrative, medical, or mixed claims continuum of Pegram, courts have
been more willing to view quality of care and malpractice claims as exempt
from ERISA preemption, irrespective of the insurance arrangements of the
employer plan. Such claims invoke concerns which traditionally fall under
state jurisdiction.353 Because IMR targets medical treatment decisions, and
by design screens out most benefit, coverage, and eligibility determinations,
it falls easily on the medical care/quality side of emerging legal
frameworks. States may find this helpful in their attempts to both broaden
beneficiary eligibility for IMR as well as broaden IMR regulations to
encompass all health plans.
354
In sum, looking at the dynamic state of current law, the inequities across
insurance sub-populations, and the modesty of medical necessity reviews,
there might be strong legal and public policy reasons for state legislatures to
broaden the application of IMR. Furthermore, there could be strong reasons
for the Court to continue to narrow ERISA preemption for a larger
constellation of employer-based arrangements.
351. Smarter Health Care Partnership for American Families: Making Federal and
State Roles in Managed Care Regulation and Liability Work For Accountable and
Affordable Health Care Coverage: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House
Comm. Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 82 (2001) (statement of Sara Rosenbaum,
Professor of Health Law and Policy, George Washington Univ. School of Public Health &
Health Servs.) [hereinafter Hearings]. See also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228-37.
352. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 356-58 (3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 109 (1995). In Dukes, the plaintiff was asking for damages that went beyond
ERISA remedies, yet the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff's claims for damages, under
various theories for injuries arising from medical malpractice of HMO-affiliated hospitals
and medical personnel, were not claims to recover benefits due or to clarify rights under the
terms of their health plan and could be remanded to state court. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
also held that an HMO's policy of discharging newborn infants within twenty-four hours
after delivery was a medical care determination and not a benefits determination. 193 F.3d
151 (3rd Cir. 1999).
353. Cf Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F..3d 266, 272 (3rd Cir. 2001) (citing
In re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 162).
354. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
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V. BOXING IN IMR
While the Court may be narrowing the scope of ERISA preemption, in so
doing, it has created a box for state-based IMR, which while protecting
IMR from preemption, also constrains it. In other words, IMR was saved
from preemption on the basis of the Court's determination that it is not
arbitration or an alternative remedy that goes beyond ERISA's civil
enforcement scheme;355 however, as such, IMR cannot be expanded to
embrace characteristics of arbitration or similar alternative remedies,
characteristics that would presumably improve the IMR process and would
appease many IMR critics. Critics of IMR argue that IMR is too narrow a
remedy because the disputes are related to questions of medical care
standards only, rather than broader questions of coverage and benefits.
Furthermore, critics argue that the remedy of external review does not
provide adequate procedural justice. In essence, IMR proponents and
critics alike may run up against the constraints placed upon this remedy by
the Court, which may limit attempts to broaden IMR or make it more
effective.
Specifically, while external review has emerged as the prototype for
resolving medical necessity disputes between health plans and consumers,
several critics have chronicled its shortcomings. Shirley Eiko Sanematsu, a
critic of the California managed care reforms, finds fault with the
limitations of the IMR remedy because it excludes review of coverage
disputes and too often draws a false distinction between medical care
treatment issues and coverage.356 She believes state IMR regulations take
too narrow a view of medical disputes between patient, plan, and
provider. 357 Additionally, medical necessity, an objective standard, allows
plans to convert care issues into coverage issues. For example, an atypical
prescription for baby formula for a rare pediatric allergy is converted by a
health plan to a request to cover a "food supplement." For the infant in
question, it is medically appropriate care.358 Senematsu argues for a more
subjective standard to address individual patient needs, 359 allowing a
broader review of factors, which would be helpful in determining what
355. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 382-83 (2002).
356. Shirley Eiko Sanematsu, Taking a Broader View of Treatment Disputes Beyond
Managed Care: Are Recent Legislative Efforts the Cure?, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1245, 1269-
71(2001).
357. Id. at 1249. Sanematsu argues that the definition of medical necessity is too narrow
and as such does not adequately address individual patient needs. Moreover, IMR as
currently conducted converts all care delivery disputes into solely medical care issues.
358. Id. at 1277.
359. Id. at 1269-70.
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360might be best for a patient.
Other commentators criticize IMR because it places insufficient
emphasis on pre-dispute conflict management, arguing that pre-dispute
conflict management would encourage health plans to respond early and
effectively to reduce formal disputes. 36' These reviewers posit a conflict
resolution scheme as an alternative to reliance on ADR-type mechanisms,
like IMR, or quasi-judicial ADR mechanisms, such as mediation or
arbitration.362 Specifically, Kathy Cerminara has called for the adoption of
improved, institutionalized conflict management strategies within the
managed care industry as opposed to the use of ad hoc, traditional ADR
approaches.363
Cerminara argues for health plans to improve information disclosure and
complaint and grievance resolution in a manner that offers as much
procedural justice as possible. Cerminara further believes that many patient
frustrations stem from misunderstanding and misinformation rather than a
denial of rights.364 Accordingly, health care organizations should invest in
conflict management rather than react only to "cognizable disputes" and
should offer "contextualized ADR possibilities" rather than "cookie cutter"
mandates. , 3
65
Similarly, Aaron Kesselheim views external appeals as a futile attempt at
improving health care delivery.366 Kesselheim argues that focusing
360. Id. at 1278-80. Senematsu comments that treatment decisions often involve
personal goals, interests and religious faith-all of which should be factored into dispute
resolution processes; these aspects are not considered in the current dispute resolution
mechanisms that view treatment issues through the objective lens of medicine alone. Id.
1276-85. Senematsu views this problem as particularly heightened with respect to treatment
decisions at the end of life or with severely damaged infants (what she refers to as futile
care). In these situations, dispute resolution should take into account non-biomedical
factors. Id. at 1281, 1285. Although she recognizes that IMR is a result of the managed care
backlash, principally targeted to place decision-making back in the hands of caregivers, she
questions why reviews are limited to physicians, excluding for example, clergy, ethicists,
disability rights advocates, and others. Id. at 1270. See also Kesselheim, supra note 260, at
911.
361. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal Aimed at
Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 549 (2002); Naomi Karp
& Erica Wood, Symposium, "MEDISPUTE: Resolving Health Care Conflicts, " Health Plan
Internal Consumer Dispute Resolution Practices: Highlights From a National Study, 5 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 283, 329-34.
362. Cerminara, supra note 361, at 548-50.
363. Id. at 560, 583, 585. Cerminara also describes ADR in four separate categories:
adjudicatory, consensual, advisory and cross-over techniques, placing external review in the
adjudicatory category along with arbitration. Id. at 552.
364. Id. at 586.
365. Id. at 593.
366. Kesselheim, supra note 260, at 886.
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resources on IMR diverts managed care entities from developing more
effective patient protection measures.367 While IMR creates established
procedures for appeal, prompt decisions, and methods for empowering
patients in the process through providing informal advice and
information,368  Kesselheim believes these reforms are not enough.
External review systems should publicly disseminate trend data on
outcomes, report anonymous results to foster patient confidence,
universally bind health plans to results, mandate that care is uniformly
continued during the time of appeal with costs imposed on insurers, 369 and
provide absolute assurance that plans do not select reviewers.370
Another critic of IMR, Judge Joyce Krutick Craig, represents a different
vision of dispute resolution in managed care. 371 Because managed care
grievances raise issues of law, as well as medicine,372 these issues are best
integrated in a uniform, federal grievance system like the current Medicare
appeals procedure which takes place before an AL. 373  Since mixed
disputes about coverage and care have been handled for years in Social
Security, disability, or Medicare benefit appeals, the corps of 1100 judges
in 132 hearing offices 374 are the most skilled workforce to handle managed
care disputes.375 This system enables direct involvement of the consumer in
a hearing, creates uniformity across states, and requires no affirmative
action on the part of the patient, thus enabling much higher rates of review.
If a care decision is denied, it is automatically reviewed. This explains why
the appeal rates of Medicare, TRICARE (the military health plan program),
and the Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan are higher.376
In Judge Craig's view, the current system of IMR, as well as the federal
patient protection legislation that proposes to federalize IMR, relies too
heavily on an internal, multi-level health plan appeals process and is too
time consuming to be effective. 377 Most patients do not have time to follow
367. Id. at 915-16.
368. Id. at 887-88.
369. Id. at 889.
370. Id. at 891. With the exception of adherence to the principle of "uniformly
continued treatment during the time of appeal," most state IMR systems are evolving
precisely in the manner Kesselheim suggests.
371. See generally Judge Craig, supra note 163 (proposing a unified federal grievance
procedure).
372. Id. at 398-402.
373. Id. at 339-402.
374. Id. at 399 (reflecting the numbers in the ALJ judge corps at the time of writing).
375. Id. at 400-01.
376. Judge Morgan, supra note 9, at 18-23.
377. Judge Craig, supra note 163, at 394. Judge Craig reviews the patient protection
legislation introduced in 1999-2000, including the Daschle-Kennedy bill and the ultimate bill
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through on an appeal, and IMR review requirements fail to provide a patient
in one state covered by a managed care organization the same remedies as
available in another state covered by the same entity.37 8 As an alternative to
the current IMR process, Judge Craig focuses on the need to craft a fast,
easy, uniform system offering due process to all sides and similar to the
system set up for Social Security, disability, or Medicare benefits
appeals.379
Even in light of the criticisms and alternatives presented, IMR still has
merit. Senematsu's critique suggests that IMR is seriously flawed because
the "coverage versus care" dilemma is fundamentally problematic.
Opening up the IMR process to all denials and broadening the review of
certain decisions with expert multi-disciplinary panels could accommodate
these criticisms. Judge Craig's vision is more difficult to reconcile with
IMR. Although her approach responds to some of the criticism leveled
against IMR, it also presents a departure from the current ERISA system, is
difficult to reconcile with the current state-based IMR approach, and could
be viewed as similarly bureaucratic.
Other commentators with more positive assessments of IMR, such as
Louise Trubeck, reinforce the notion that the IMR system provides
substantive assistance, encourages consumers and plans to resolve disputes
informally, has a positive impact on health plan practices and consumer
advocacy, and builds consumer confidence in managed care.3 8° Michael
Ginsberg, another supporter of IMR, explains that external review appears
to raise quality of care and consumer confidence effectively without leading
to excessive costs, systematic bias, or resistance from HMOs.38 1
While IMR will not resolve fundamental problems in the incentive
structure of managed care, which is driven by economic and efficiency
382considerations, expanding legal remedies beyond the current bounds of
which passed the house, the Bi-Partisan Patient Protection Act, infra note 413.
378. Judge Craig, supra note 163, at 398.
379. Id. at 402 n.641. Judge Craig sees this as an informal, administrative law hearing
wherein the patient would have a right to counsel, but because the ALJ is duty bound to
protect the rights of the claimant, there is no requirement for representation. Moreover,
these hearings are considered non-adversarial and "user friendly."
380. Trubeck, supra note 262, at 140, 144.
381. Michael E. Ginsberg, HMO Grievance Process, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 237, 245-47
(2000). Ginsburg argues that instituting HMO tort liability across the board would not
improve care beyond the benefits already achieved by IMR. Id. at 246-47. Moreover,
external review cures the inevitable problem of incomplete contracting in the health care
benefit arena, where it is very difficult to specify exactly what medical services are needed to
be covered by insurance given patient heterogeneity. See Sloan & Hall, supra note 231, 192-
200.
382. See generally Cerminara, supra note 361; Kesselheim, supra note 260; Senematsu,
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IMR may be unrealistic. The fragile five-four majority of Moran held that
IMR was permissible under ERISA precisely because it was constrained
and not an alternate dispute resolution scheme. It appears that state-based
remedies, for now, must comfortably settle within the tight boundaries
articulated by the Court, boundaries which suggest that only modest
expansion in remedies would be tolerated.
Consequently, the more fundamental hurdle facing additional remedies is
whether they would be consistent with the Court's framework in Moran,
and thus consistent with ERISA's civil enforcement scheme.383 This is
especially pertinent because whether IMR was or was not considered
arbitration was a pivotal issue in the Moran opinion and was the chief factor
producing the five-four split: the majority would have held IMR was
preempted if they had thought IMR was arbitration.
Although the majority conceded that IMR has arbitration-like features in
that it involves a third party reviewer and forms a binding decision on a
plan, IMR does not fully resemble contract interpretation or evidentiary
litigation in front of an arbitrator.384 On the contrary, IMR involves review
of limited clinical evidence rather than a fully developed evidentiary
function. 385  IMR is not conducted with cross-examination, nor does it
exhibit judicial-like power over the disputing parties as exists in the full
determination of a case or controversy. The reviewer is not interpreting the
386law, but rather a single contractual term. More specifically, the reviewer
is establishing a medical standard of care.387 Furthermore, IMR merely
requires that ERISA plans provide an additional layer of administrative
review or administrative procedure, which the Court likened to a mandated
benefit or a mandated procedure. 388  Last, IMR precedes and does not
supra note 356 (demonstrating this basic point as a theme throughout their articles).
383. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), (a)(1) (2000). See also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a), (a)(1) (West
2003). ERISA's civil enforcement scheme permits plan participants to bring an internal
appeal to a plan's fiduciary or administrator and then to file suit in federal court. Such
actions are exclusive remedies solely to recover plan benefits, to enforce beneficiary rights
under a plan, or to clarify a right to future benefits. More specifically, ERISA limits enrollee
damages to statutory penalties, which the secretary can exact from a plan fiduciary, contract
damages, equitable relief and, at the discretion of the court, attorney's fees. See David A.
Humiston et al., Navigating the Shoals of ERISA: The Effect of ERISA Preemption on New
State Laws Creating Tort Liability Against Managed Care Entities, 14 HEALTH LAWYER
(ABA), Aug. 2002, at 3-5, 7-8.
384. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 382-83 (2002).
385. Id. at 383.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 384. See also Miles Zaremski, In Furtherance of Accountability in Health
Care: Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 14 HEALTH LAWYER (ABA), June 2002, at 23.
388. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (avoiding preemption of a
state mandate for mental health benefits on the basis of the savings clause as a law
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preclude judicial scrutiny and imposes no new obligations or causes of
action.389  Thus, IMR does not disturb ERISA's civil enforcement
scheme.39° In sum, the majority posited that the preemption and arbitration
analogy simply "runs out of steam" in application to IMR.391
On the other side, the dissent viewed the Illinois IMR provision as
arbitration, undermining ERISA's exclusive civil enforcement scheme. 392
Justice Thomas wrote that Debra Moran had ample and multiple remedial
devices under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B). 393 This section includes the right to a
civil suit to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan, to obtain a
declaratory judgment that she was entitled to benefits, and to enjoin an
improper refusal to pay for benefits. Suits under § 502(a)(2) and § 409
would have allowed her to seek removal of the fiduciary, and § 502(g)
would have allowed a claim for attorney's fees.394 In the opinion of the
dissenting justices, Section 4-10 of Illinois' Health Maintenance
Organization Act395 was viewed as an alternate state remedy because it
granted a binding determination guiding benefits.396
Justice Thomas chided the majority for its determination that IMR was
within the boundaries of the ERISA civil enforcement scheme because it
merely added a second opinion provision to state health insurance
specifically regulating insurance); Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Ward, 526 U.S. 368,
377 (1999) (holding that a California notice prejudice rule is not preempted because it adds a
procedural requirement to an insurance contract; procedural requirements that complement
rather than contradict ERISA are not preempted). In Unum, the Court rejected the insurance
company's suggestion that the notice prejudice rule conflicted with § 1133 of ERISA, which
requires plans to provide notice and the opportunity for review of denied claims, or with
Department of Labor regulations providing that a claim is filed when the requirements of a
reasonable claims filing procedure have been met. Id. at 375-380. By allowing a longer
period to file than the minimum filing terms mandated by federal law, the notice prejudice
rules complemented rather than contradicted ERISA regulation. Id. at 377. Section 4-10 of
Illinois' law resembles the claims procedure rule sustained in Unum where the Court upheld
a state law barring enforcement of a policy's claim filing limit even though the state rule
could mean the difference between success and failure for a beneficiary. See Humiston et
al., supra note 383, at 3, 7 and n.13.
389. Moran, 536 U.S. at 386.
390. Zaremski, supra note 387.
391. Moran, 536 U.S. at 382-84. The Court also variously quotes the Uniform
Arbitration Act, §§ 5, 8, 7 U.L.A. 173 (1997) and the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. § 7
(2000).
392. Moran, 536 U.S. at 392 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981)).
393. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000); Moran, 536 U.S. at 394.
394. Moran, 536 U.S. at 395 n.5.
395. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 125/4-10 (2000).
396. Moran, 536 U.S. at 394-95, 398 (2002).
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contracts.397 The dissent noted Fort Halifax Parking Company v. Coyne,
482 U.S. 1, 16 (1987), in which the Court held that a state cannot avoid
ERISA preemption by mandating a benefit.3 98 The Court ignored the
"interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent" nature of the ERISA
remedial scheme and announced that the relevant inquiry is whether a state
regulatory scheme provides a new cause of action or new form of relief.3 99
In a conciliatory manner, Justice Thomas ultimately acknowledged that
there might be advantages to allowing states to implement IMR as a
supplement to ERISA remedies, but that this decision was to be made by
Congress.
400
Given this backdrop, how firm is the Court's support for IMR, and what,
if anything, would tip members of the majority over to the dissent? The
Court noted in Moran that "[a] state might provide for a type of review that
would so resemble an adjudication as to fall within Pilot Life's categorical
bar.''4° Therefore, a state would risk preemption by either adding a new
cause of action or an additional claim for damages. Further, new state
remedies or procedural requirements would have to effect substantive, not
merely procedural, change.4 °2
In fact, few of the suggestions offered by the critics above seem to
conflict with the Court's essential framework that damages in an action
against an ERISA health plan are limited to the cost of the benefit denied.
The five-member majority in Moran would probably remain firm if
additional remedies, including state-based judicial claims built carefully
around the frame of IMR, carried remedies exclusively allowed under
ERISA and specifically excluded extra-contractual damages.
40 3
Accordingly, it is unlikely that the Court would allow ERISA to preempt
a state-based regimen that allowed any of the following elements: 1)
external review coupled with a pre-litigation ADR mechanism, such as
397. Moran, 536 U.S. at 397.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 402.
401. Id. at 378-381. See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987)
(holding that an ERISA plan participant seeking punitive damages under Mississippi
common law due to an insurer's alleged bad faith in processing a claim was preempted
because the bad faith cause of action was not saved as a law directly related to insurance and
because tortious breach of contract provided an alternative remedy (a legal remedy) in
conflict with ERISA remedies, which are meant to be exclusive for plan participants
asserting improper processing of benefits). See also Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings
Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 126-27 (2001).
402. See Interview with Mark Rust, supra note 329.
403. Humiston et al., supra note 383, at 8.
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mediation; 2) non-binding determinations on the beneficiary; 3) ERISA-like
remedies exclusively; 4) limited evidentiary functions, such as limited
discovery or testimony of parties or experts where reviewers/adjudicators
are devoid ofjudicial-like power over the disputing parities; 5) professional,
discipline-based judgments made by reviewers in addition to physicians;
and 6) subsequent suit in federal or state court that focused on quality of
care, medical treatment, or claims where these issues were inextricably
bound with coverage and benefits issues. These elements, among the many
dispute resolution ideas gathered herein from critics, might fit into the
framework handed down by the Court.
VI. HARMONIZING STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
Concurrent with the rush to institute state systems of external review and
the judiciary's attempts to clarify the scope of ERISA preemption,4°4 the
federal executive and legislative branches have been busy instituting their
own response to managed care and ERISA. Congress has tried to pass
patient protection legislation, albeit unsuccessfully.40 5 The Department of
Labor ("DOL") successfully promulgated new rules governing ERISA
health plans and added important claims review, notice, and timeliness
measures to improve appeal procedures for ERISA health plan
beneficiaries.40 6 However, although changes in ERISA rules are welcome,
the DOL is unable to add a comparable IMR scheme to ERISA.4 °7
Implementation of IMR is beyond the DOL's authority because external
review represents a substantive change demanding Congressional action.40 8
Therefore, the interrelated problems of IMR dissemination, limitations in
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme for harms incurred, difficulties in
mounting challenges to ERISA preemption, and the inequities created
among similarly situated patients continue to beg for Congressional action.
In response, Congress should either directly amend ERISA or pass broader
patient protection legislation to do the same.
404. Hearings, supra note 351, at 82-85 (statement of Sara Rosenbaum, Professor of
Health Law and Policy, George Washington Univ. School of Public Health and Health
Servs.). See also Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228-37.
405. See infra text accompanying notes 413-425.
406. Admin. & Enforcement Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, Rules and Regulations for Admin. & Enforcement, Claims Procedure, 29 C.F.R. §
2560.503-1 (2003); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, FACT SHEET PATIENTS' RIGHTS CLAIMS
PROCEDURE REGULATION (Nov. 2000), available at http://www.dol.govebsanewsroom/
fs I 12000.html.
407. Hearings, supra note 35 1, at 68 (statement of Jane F. Greenman, Deputy General
Counsel, Honeywell, on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee).
408. Id.
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To directly amend ERISA, Congress should either craft a uniform federal
regime for all ERISA plans, comparable to the IMR prototype, utilizing
existing-state based external review systems 409 or pass legislation that
precludes preemption of state laws addressing mixed eligibility and
treatment decisions made by managed care entities.4 ° Such amendments
could be broad enough not only to end preemption of state laws mandating
external review but also laws providing additional liability protection using
new causes of action .41 These amendments could replace ERISA's current
claims appeals process and also allow additional remedies that go beyond
ERISA's current scheme.
Suspending ERISA preemption for managed care accountability
mechanisms would exchange uniformity in the regulation of ERISA plans
for uniformity in the handling of grievances for patients regardless of plan
sponsor. These are reasonable public policy tradeoffs. Furthermore, health
plans and their sponsors are already attuned to existing state differences in
licensure, oversight, reporting, coverage mandates, and other patient
protections.41 2 Congress and health plans have surely contemplated such
variation across the states. Even federal patient rights legislation promotes
only a common federal floor.
The second, and perhaps less likely way to harmonize state and federal
regulation, is to provide similar remedies for all health plan beneficiaries
with a federal patient protection act. Both the House and the Senate in the
107th Congress passed versions of this legislation; however, a law was
never enacted.4t 3 Congress was to appoint a conference committee to meet
409. Congress could create a federal external review system, but this would be
duplicative and costly. Although Justice Joyce Craig would like to see a federal appeals
process using the ALJ for all health plan members, ERISA or not, this goes too far in
institutionalizing the IMR approach. No one has suggested that the Departments of Labor or
HHS would ever develop a federal system to handle exclusively ERISA claims (and none of
the patient protection bills have suggested that approach).
410. Representative Charles Norwood, a Georgia Republican, introduced a direct
amendment in the ERISA Clarification Act of 2003, H.R. 596, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill
excludes from preemption:
Any State cause of action to enforce a determination under a group health
plan ... regarding the existence or extent of coverage of any item or service
under the plan to the extent that the determination is of whether or not the item or
service is medically necessary or appropriate or is based on the application of
substantially equivalent terms.
Id. (emphasis added). This bill complements the introduction of a new version of
Representative Norwood's Patient Protection Act, H.R. 597, 108th Cong. (2003).
411. See generally Agrawal & Hall, supra note 46 (discussing the evolution of ERISA
toward allowing state tort liability actions and damage suits).
412. See supra Part II and Ii.
413. Bi-Partisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); Bi-Partisan Patient
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in the fall of 2001, but the events of September l1th turned Congress'
attention toward matters of national security. 414  Additionally, Congress
never finished appointing its conferees and controversy remained between
the executive and legislative branch around several politically hot issues,
principally involving a patient's right to sue health plans.
Despite differences between the House and Senate bills, their respective
legislation was quite similar. Both bills negated ERISA preemption of state
causes of action involving medically reviewable health plan determinations,
although the bills differed on whether claims would be governed by federal
or state law.415 Both the House and Senate had similar monetary penalties
should health plans fail to follow the determinations of an external
416review. Both bills embraced rights under a new federal cause of action-
breach of duty of "ordinary care"-to sue health plans for coverage,
eligibility, or reimbursement decisions that resulted in personal injury or
wrongful death, even though the bills had different damage caps. 417
The core provisions of the bills-protecting patient access and
establishing external and internal review-were virtually identical. There
was widespread agreement that there should be a uniform federal standard
for independent, external review. Specifically, both bills amended ERISA
Protection Act, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
414. Rhonda McMillion, Unfinished Business: Congress Returns Attention to Patients'
Rights, Bankruptcy Reform, 88 A.B.A. J. 74, 74 (Jan. 2002).
415. Both the Senate and House bills require patients to exhaust external and internal
appeals before they go to court unless they can prove irreparable harm if they wait. Jared
Wolf, Senate Passes Patients' Bill of Rights by 59-36 Vote, NATION'S CITIES WKLY., July
2001. Punitive damages are prohibited in federal court, but civil penalties are allowed up to
$5 million dollars in the Senate version with no limit on economic and non-economic
damages. Id.; McMillion, supra note 414. In a last minute compromise with the White
House, Representative Norwood successfully amended the House version to ensure that state
court actions could proceed but under federal remedies with a cap on non-economic damages
of $1.5 million and punitive damages at $1.5 million. H.R. 2563 § 402(a) (2001).
Nevertheless, the Senate bill passed with a statutory damage clause that set forth a civil
assessment of up to $5,000,000 payable to a claimant in an action for bad faith and flagrant
disregard for the rights of a beneficiary. S. 1052 § 402(a) (2001).
416. Both bills include additional monetary penalties: up to $1000 per day for each day
from the date of a determination until a benefit deemed required is provided; $10,000 for
failing to follow timelines in any case in which treatment is not commenced in accordance
with the determination of an IMR; authority to obtain a cease and desist order and order
attorney's fees for refusal to provide a benefit as determined; additional penalties against a
person acting in the capacity of authorizing (or rather not authorizing) benefits for a plan.
H.R. 2563 § 104(f), 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1052 § 104(f), 107th Cong. (2001). Moreover,
patterns of repeated refusal to authorize benefits, violate requirements of the internal and
external appeal and the act would translate to monetary penalties of the lesser of twenty-five
percent of the aggregate value of benefits shown to have not been provided, or unlawfully
delayed by a plan or $500,000. H.R. 2563 § 104(f); S. 1052 § 104(f).
417. H.R. 2563 § 402; S. 1052 § 402.
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and created mirror-image internal and external review provisions for claims
involving medical necessity and appropriateness, E/I treatment, and other
coverage decisions that require a review of medical facts. Both bills
contemplated one level of internal health plan review. Furthermore, the
bills created a process, directed by health plans, by which plans would use
federally qualified, certified IROs to determine both eligibility of a claim
411for review and would conduct and oversee the review.
Nevertheless, there is lingering concern about removing ERISA
preemption, and adding new causes of action and monetary penalties. 419
Similarly, there is general concern regarding whether federal law would or
should preempt state law in the patient protection area, with respect to
external and internal review, patient access, choice and provider
protections. This is true even though both bills establish clear certification
processes for state laws and would allow states to retain state regulatory
systems that are substantially equivalent to federal standards.42° Should
patient protection legislation pass, most states with prototype IMR systems
will likely retain their traditional role of determining eligibility of a claim
for review, overseeing the external review process, and developing
essential, supportive consumer services.421
Finally, both bills would protect employers who were not direct-decision
makers from specific claims of liability and would exempt employer
conduct in the normal exercise of fiduciary duties, such as designing
benefits and dispute resolution schemes. However, there are lingering
concerns in the employer community about employer liability when health
plans are sued.422
418. H.R. 2563 §§ 103, 104; S. 1052 §§ 103, 104 (2001).
419. The framework in these congressional bills codifies the "quality versus quantity" or
"medical versus plan administration" distinctions which the courts have attempted to make
for purposes of ERISA preemption. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350
(3rd Cir. 1995); Pegram, 530 U.S. at 211. These bills allow state-based claims directly
against health plans when the plan denies claims for benefits for medically necessary or
appropriate care, for E/I care, or for "denials otherwise based on an evaluation of medical
facts. The latter category includes a "determination that the item or service or condition is
not covered based on grounds that require an evaluation of medical facts by a health care
professional in the specific case involved to determine the coverage and extent of coverage
of the item or service or condition." H.R. 2563 §§ 104(d)(2); S. 1052 § 104(d)(2).
420. H.R. 2563 § 152; S. 1052 § 152.
421. H.R. 2563 § 152; S. 1052 § 152.
422. Hearings, supra note 351, at 67-70 (referencing statement of Jane F. Greenman,
Deputy General Counsel, Honeywell, on behalf of the ERISA Industry Committee). The
bills protect employers from suit in federal court by allowing them to designate decision-
makers with respect to medical care treatment versus fiduciary decisions. H.R. 2563 §
402(c)(18); S. 1052 § 402(c)(18). The employer community, as represented by these
comments is probably not entirely satisfied with this protection given that there still would
2004]
63
Berman-Sandler: Independent Medical Review: Expanding Legal Remedies to Achieve M
Published by LAW eCommons, 2004
Annals of Health Law
As a result, patient protection legislation recently introduced by
Representative Charles Norwood does not include any of the expansive
federal civil remedies for private rights of action found in earlier versions of
legislation.423 Expanding tort and contract-based liability protections for
patients seems to have been swallowed up by increased controversy over
tort and medical malpractice liability reform. Clearly, health plans will do
everything they can to avoid the machinations of the tort law system now
under fire.424 Therefore, it is not clear that patient protection legislation or
legislation to harmonize federal and state regulatory functions that impinge
on managed care will pass in the near future.425 Harmonizing state and
federal law through the passage of federal patient protection legislation
seems presently out of reach.
PART VII. CONCLUSION
IMR is a viable remedy to promote managed care accountability. It is a
prudent approach to reducing human suffering and the pain of litigation. It
offers an accessible process for beneficiaries to claim that treatment or
reimbursement is due, and it has proven to have a positive impact on the
delivery of managed health care. Reports from some of the most
sophisticated state-based systems, however, suggest that IMR is still
cumbersome, overly time consuming, excludes important disputes about
coverage and benefits (outside of medical necessity disputes), and requires
streamlining to maximize its potential.
State agency leaders who are pleased with IMR overall are focused on
providing better consumer education and support, more disclosure on IMR
results, and greater engagement of consumers and providers. Critics are
split, with those applauding the IMR scheme and others wanting to improve
conflict management processes internal to plans. Some commentators want
states to broaden or enhance the remedy in order to foster a more open
review and adjudicatory process, and to infuse the system with greater
procedural justice at every step. However, at the same time, expansion of
state remedies cannot further tempt ERISA preemption.
While a cornerstone of managed care reform and due process, IMR is not
be need for discovery on the extent of employers' relationships to health plan and medical
decision-making. From the employers' viewpoint, the patient protection legislation
introduced, does not adequately shield them from liability exposure or legal costs incurred in
defending health plan liability cases. Id. at 69.
423. H.R. 597, 108th Cong. (2003).
424. Marcia Coyle, In Washington, Old Fights Are New Again, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 18,
2002, at Al.
425. Blum, supra note 258, at 327.
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accessible to everyone. Despite the Moran decision, which was significant
in stabilizing and expanding the reach of IMR, it is still unavailable to
beneficiaries of purely self-funded employer health plans. The last frontier,
therefore, is to harmonize state and federal regimes either through passage
of patient protection legislation or through congressional action to amend
ERISA. Without this, new state-based reforms and claims 426 will continue
to push against the ERISA shield, and will push open the doors that Moran
has left ajar.
426. See generally Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002), petition for
cert. filed June 3, 2003, pending conference (No. 02-1826), available at http://
www.search.access.gpo.gov (raising ERISA preemption with regard to allowing state claims
under Texas' new tort-based cause of action to move forward). This new cause of action
aims to hold health plans directly liable when in breach of their duties of ordinary care in
instances where medical necessity determinations are alleged to have caused patient injury
and harm. Id.
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APPENDIX A: CHART I
California Michigan New York Pennsylvania
Authorizing S.B. 189; A.B. Patients Rights External Review Act 68, the Quality
Legislation 55 (1999) and Independent Law of 1998 Health Care
Review Act Accountability and
(PRIRA) of Protection Act
2000
Types of Managed care All health plans All health plans Managed Care only
Health Plans plans (except
Subject to M+C) and
Review indemnity-
based health
insurance
companies
Types of Only denials All denials, Only denials Only denials based on
Disputes based on except for clear based on medical medical necessity and
Subject to medical and valid necessity and appropriateness;
Review necessity and coverage experimental/ includes experimental/
experimental/ exclusions and investigational investigational
investigational coverage treatment treatment
treatment termination
Is Decision Yes Yes Yes Yes
Binding?
Are Reviewers No No No Yes
Bound by
Plan's
Definition of
Medical
Necessity?
Who Selects State State State State
External
Review
Entity?
Who Decides State State State Plan
if a Dispute is
Eligible for
External
Review ?
Who Accepts State State State Plan
Applications
for External
Review?
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APPENDIX A: CHART I (CONT.)
299
California Michigan New York Pennsylvania
Do Consumers 6 months 60 days (from 45 days (from 15 days (after receipt
Have Limited receipt of final receipt of the final of final denial letter
Time to adverse adverse from plan)
Request determination) determination
External from the first
Review (filing level of internal
deadline)? appeal within the
plan)
Total 33 days 26 days 37 days plus 5 60 days
Available business days
Time to
Complete
Entire Process
Time Limit for 30 days 14 days 30 days 40 days
Review Entity
to Reach
Decision
Time Limit for 3 days (or 3 days (72 3 days 2 business days (or
Expedited sooner as hours) (or sooner sooner as determined
Review determined by as determined by by medical exigencies
medical medical of the case. Also
exigencies of exigencies of the allow additional time,
the case. Also case) with specific time
allow limits, for certain tasks
additional time, in the process)
with specific
time limits, for
certain tasks in
the process)
Consumer No No $50 $25
Charged a Fee
for Requesting
an External
Review?
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APPENDIX A: CHART I (CONT.)
427. New York State reports that costs vary with type of review and circumstances. The
2002 External Appeal Program Annual report excludes cost information. However, an
estimate of average cost can be derived by matching reported costs to all health plans for
types of external determinations and graphs listing the number of "External Appeal
Decisions by Type of Denial found respectively on p. 28 and p. 48 of New York State
Department of Insurance and Department of Health, External Appeal Program Annual
Report 2001. This report presents cumulative data from July 1, 1999 through June 29, 2001.
Calculated average costs of a Medical Necessity Review is $544; Experimental/
Investigational $2210.
California Michigan New York Pennsylvania
Cost Per Case Medical $600-700 N/A 427  $750
(approximate Necessity: (average)
average) Standard: $395
Expedited: $500
Experimental/
Investigational:
Standard: $1750
Expedited: $2500
California Michigan New York Pennsylvania
Cost: Who State (subject State (with plan Health Plan (fees Plan, but when
Pays for to periodic regulatory fees) determined by the provider initiates
External assessments on state) appeal, the non-
Review? health plans) prevailing party pays
Department Director and Commissioner Commissioner Secretary
Oversight Clinical OR
Mechanism Advisory Board Superintendent
Can Patient Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sue?
Jurisdiction of Consumer must Concurrent Concurrent Consumer must
Courts exhaust IMR Jurisdiction Jurisdiction exhaust IMR first
first
New Cause of Yes No No No
Action
Presumption No No No Rebuttal presumption
in Law: Pro in favor of the IRO
Health Plan? decision
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APPENDIX B: CHART II
California Michigan New York428  Pennsylvania
Start Date of 1999-2000 (E/I 1978 1999 1991
Program reviews) 2001
(medical necessity
IMRs added &
system placed
under state control)
PERIOD 1
Reporting 2001429 10/00-8/01 2001 1/99-9/01
Period (2.5 years)
No. of Cases 723 271 979430 N/A
Accepted for
Review
No. of Cases 601 220 937 245
Determined
Decision 38% 50% 40% 44%
Overturned
Decision N/A N/A 9% N/A
Modified
Decision 62% 50% 51% 55%
Upheld
428. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS. & DEPT. OF HEALTH, N.Y. STATE EXTERNAL APPEAL
PROGRAM 2002, at 31, available at www.nystategov.us [hereinafter 2002 APPEAL PROGRAM].
429. Data is taken from STATE OF CALIFORNIA, HMO HELP CENTER, DEP'T OF
MANAGED CARE, ANN. REP. 2001, JOHN Q DOESN'T LIVE HERE ANYMORE. Data was also
taken from CAL. HEALTH CARE FUND, INDEPENDENT MEDICAL REVIEW, PHASE II, at 3, 71
app.C (Apr. 2003).
430. This estimate is derived from the number of applications received cumulatively in
New York from the start date of the IMR program to the close of each fiscal year backing
out data from prior year reports. FY 2002 (12 mos.) data was extrapolated from 18 month
data reported from July 2001 to December 2002 and added to NY cumulative data (due to
the state's change in reporting period to calendar year). The number of cases accepted for
review includes cases reversed by health plans while pending review and excludes number
of rejected applications to be consistent with. other state reports. See 2002 APPEAL
PROGRAM, supra note 428, at 14; N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS. & DEP'T OF HEALTH, A REPORT
ON EXTERNAL APPEALS IN NEW YORK, July 1 1999-JUNE 30, 2001, at 27; N.Y. STATE DEP'T
OF INS. & DEP'T OF HEALTH, A REPORT ON EXTERNAL APPEALS IN NEW YORK, JULY 1 2000-
JUNE 31, 2001, at 29, available at www.nystategov.us.
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APPENDIX B: CHART II (CONT.)
431. All 2002 data is taken from State of California, "Independent Medical Review
Determinations," at www.dmhc.ca.gov/imr/stats.pdf. E-mail correspondence, Tom Gilevich,
October 2, 2003.
432. Rates of increase are approximations based on widely varying time periods for
Reporting Period 1; however, these numbers convey an accurate estimate of how IMR
requests are either increasing or stabilizing in the states studied.
433. Michigan received 455 requests for dispute resolution; fourteen were withdrawn for
various reasons including lack of state jurisdiction, leaving 441 cases accepted for review.
Of these, 128 were successfully resolved while pending review; nineteen remained pending
at the end of 2002; and 294 were fully adjudicated by staff attorneys or IRO. Of these, 123
health plan decisions were upheld and fifty-seven were overturned. Source: Telephone
confirmation of most recent statistics with Paul Duguay, Attorney, Manager of Appeals
Division, Office of Fin. & Ins. Servs., Dep't of Ins., State of Michigan.
434. See supra note 430.
435. See 2002 APPEAL PROGRAM, supra note 428, at 31.
436. Pennsylvania data from both reporting periods updated via phone interview and e-
mail correspondence from Stacy Mitchell, Director of Bureau of Managed Care,
Pennsylvania Department of Health, April-June 2003; 528 external appeals were completed
1/1/99-12/31/02. The per month rates almost doubled from 8.2 to 15.8 per month.
PERIOD 2
California Michigan New York Pennsylvania
Reporting 2002431 2002 2002 9/01-
Period 12/31/02 (18
mos.)
No. of Cases 969 418433 (63%) 1241434 (27%) N/A
Accepted for
Review (rate of
increase from
prior
period)4 3
2
No. of Cases 707 (18%) 294 (33%) 950435 (2%) 283436 (200%)
Determined 180 IMR
114 Contractual
Decision 35% 32% 37% 41%
Overturned
Decision N/A N/A 8% N/A
Modified
Decision 65% 68% 55% 59%Upheld
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